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No Vacancy: Why Congress Can Regulate Senate Vacancy-Filling
Elections Without Amending (or Offending) the Constitution
Abstract

There currently exists no uniform method for filling vacancies in the United States Senate, leaving the states to
create and implement their own vacancy-filling procedures. As a result of recent problems under this system,
such as ex-Governor Rod Blagojevich’s notorious scandal in Illinois, some in Congress have suggested a
standardized method for filling Senate vacancies. However, an apparent constitutional conflict between the
Elections Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment’s vacancy-filling clause presents the question of whether
such standardization could be accomplished with federal legislation, or whether it would require amending
the Constitution. Applying the textual, structural, and historical approaches of constitutional interpretation to
this conflict shows that the Seventeenth Amendment did not alter Congress’s Elections Clause authority to
fashion regulations for all types of Senate elections, including those to fill vacancies. Since the Amendment’s
primary goal was to eliminate state legislatures’ selection of senators, it would be an absurd textual result to
interpret the Amendment as giving states any exclusive authority over vacancy-filling elections. Such an
interpretation would also create structural inconsistency among the Constitution’s elections provisions and
contravene the intent of the Seventeenth Amendment’s framers. Thus, if Congress wants to create a uniform
method for filling U.S. Senate vacancies, it can—and should—do so through regular federal legislation, which,
even after the Seventeenth Amendment’s ratification, remains a constitutionally-permissible exercise of
Congress’s Elections Clause authority.
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NO VACANCY: WHY CONGRESS CAN
REGULATE SENATE VACANCY-FILLING
ELECTIONS WITHOUT AMENDING (OR
OFFENDING) THE CONSTITUTION
*

ZACHARY M. ISTA

There currently exists no uniform method for filling vacancies in the United States
Senate, leaving the states to create and implement their own vacancy-filling
procedures. As a result of recent problems under this system, such as ex-Governor Rod
Blagojevich’s notorious scandal in Illinois, some in Congress have suggested a
standardized method for filling Senate vacancies.
However, an apparent
constitutional conflict between the Elections Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment’s
vacancy-filling clause presents the question of whether such standardization could be
accomplished with federal legislation, or whether it would require amending the
Constitution.
Applying the textual, structural, and historical approaches of constitutional
interpretation to this conflict shows that the Seventeenth Amendment did not alter
Congress’s Elections Clause authority to fashion regulations for all types of Senate
elections, including those to fill vacancies. Since the Amendment’s primary goal was
to eliminate state legislatures’ selection of senators, it would be an absurd textual result
to interpret the Amendment as giving states any exclusive authority over vacancyfilling elections. Such an interpretation would also create structural inconsistency
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among the Constitution’s elections provisions and contravene the intent of the
Seventeenth Amendment’s framers. Thus, if Congress wants to create a uniform
method for filling U.S. Senate vacancies, it can—and should—do so through regular
federal legislation, which, even after the Seventeenth Amendment’s ratification,
remains a constitutionally-permissible exercise of Congress’s Elections Clause authority.
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INTRODUCTION
Although his governorship ended in embarrassment, scandal, and,
1
ultimately, impeachment, one cannot deny that Rod Blagojevich
recognized the inherent value of a United States Senate seat: “I’ve
got this thing, and it’s [expletive] golden, and . . . I’m just not giving
2
it up for [expletive] nothing.”
In that now-infamous quote,
Blagojevich was referring to his power to temporarily appoint
someone to fill Illinois’s open Senate seat, which Barack Obama had
3
vacated upon his election to the presidency. However, Blagojevich
abused this power and engaged in political corruption when he
attempted to sell this Senate seat to whoever promised him a large
4
5
campaign donation or a powerful governmental appointment.
1. See Ray Long & Rick Pearson, G-Rod Out: Blagojevich Ends Political Career with
Closing Plea, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2009, at A6 (discussing the disgraced Governor’s
removal from statewide office in Illinois following his indictment on federal
corruption charges).
2. See “I’ve got this thing and it’s f---ing golden”, SALON, (Dec. 9, 2008) (on file with
Law Review), http://www.salon.com/news/primary_sources/2008/12/09/
blagojevich_complaint (describing ex-Governor Blagojevich’s expletive-laced rant
about how much political power he wielded in being able to fill Barack Obama’s
vacant Senate seat). The Federal Bureau of Investigation caught this rant on tape as
part of their ongoing investigation of the Illinois governor. Id.
3. See Michael Scherer, Governor Gone Wild: The Blagojevich Scandal, TIME, (Dec.
11, 2008), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1865954,00.html
(explaining how Governor Blagojevich treated his power like a tradable commodity).
4. See id. (describing how Blagojevich discussed appointing Representative Jesse
Jackson, Jr. to the Senate seat in exchange for $1.5 million in campaign
contributions).
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When Blagojevich’s improprieties eventually came to light, he faced
6
federal corruption charges.
While the Blagojevich saga highlighted the general problem of
political corruption, it also exposed the inherent problems with the
current system for filling Senate vacancies.
The Seventeenth
Amendment compels each state to hold an election to fill a vacant
7
Senate seat. However, the Amendment empowers states to decide
whether to temporarily fill such vacancies in the interim period
between when the seat is vacated and when an election can be held to
8
fill it permanently. Accordingly, procedures vary from state to state,
with no uniform national standard guiding how Senate vacancies are
9
filled.
In light of the Blagojevich scandal and of other recent noteworthy
10
Senate vacancies, federal lawmakers have sought to standardize how
all Senate vacancies are filled. In 2009, Representative Aaron Schock
introduced the Ethical and Legal Elections for Congressional
11
Transitions (ELECT) Act. Congressman Schock’s proposal would
require states to hold a special Senate election within ninety days of a
seat vacancy, while also allowing governors to make a temporary

5. See Natasha Korecki, Blagojevich on Jarrett: “How Bad Does She Want to Be U.S.
Senator?”, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES: THE BLAGO BLOG (June 23, 2010, 4:08 PM),
http://blogs.suntimes.com/blago/2010/06/blagojevich_on_jarrett_how_bad.html
(describing how Blagojevich wanted to be named Secretary of Health and Human
Services in exchange for appointing Obama-advisor Valerie Jarrett to the Senate).
6. See Jeff Coen, Blagojevich, Others Indicted, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2009, at A14
(detailing the federal indictment against Blagojevich, which included charges for
attempting to sell Illinois’s vacant Senate seat and for attempting to extort campaign
donations from sitting Congressmen). At his first trial, however, a deadlocked federal
jury only convicted Blagojevich on one of the twenty-four charged counts—making
false statements to the F.B.I. See Monica Davey & Susan Saulny, For Blagojevich, A
Guilty Verdict on 1 of 24 Counts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at A1 (discussing how
federal prosecutors failed to make their case to the jury in Blagojevich’s trial). At a
second trial, a new jury convicted Blagojevich of seventeen additional federal
charges. Chris Bury, Rod Blagojevich Convicted on Corruption Charges, ABC NEWS (June
27, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/rod-blagojevich-convicted-corruptioncharges/story?id=13940088#.TsnMnbKlmU8.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. When Senate vacancies occur, the Seventeenth
Amendment dictates that “the executive authority of each state shall issue writs of
election to fill such vacancies.” Id.
8. See id. (“[T]he legislature of any state may empower the executive thereof to
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the
legislature may direct.”).
9. See generally SULA P. RICHARDSON & THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
97-1009 GOV, HOUSE AND SENATE VACANCIES: HOW ARE THEY FILLED? 9 (2003)
(providing examples of various states’ methods for temporarily filling Senate
vacancies).
10. See infra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing the string of Senate
vacancies following the 2008 presidential election).
11. H.R. 899, 111th Cong. (2009).
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Senate appointment until the election was completed. That same
year, Senators Russell Feingold, John McCain, and Mark Begich
proposed an amendment to the U.S. Constitution removing states’
authority to make temporary appointments altogether by mandating
13
that all Senators be elected directly by the voters in each state.
While both proposals sought to address the perceived problems of
states’ ad hoc approach to filling Senate vacancies, one did so
through the regular legislative process, and the other proposed
14
amending the U.S. Constitution.
This significant discrepancy in
means begs the question of why some legislators felt that a
constitutional amendment was necessary to address the issue of
Senate vacancies, whereas others felt a federal statute would suffice.
The answer to that question lies in an apparent constitutional
conflict between the Elections Clause and the vacancy-filling
provision of the Seventeenth Amendment. The Elections Clause
grants Congress the power to “make or alter . . . regulations” as to the
“[t]imes, [p]laces, and [m]anner of holding [e]lections for Senators
15
and Representatives,” while the Seventeenth Amendment authorizes
states “to make temporary [Senate] appointments until the people fill
16
the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.” The conflict,
therefore, is whether the “as the legislature may direct” language in
the Seventeenth Amendment grants states exclusive power to
regulate special Senate elections, or whether their regulatory power
over those elections is subject to Congress’s Elections Clause
authority.
This Comment will argue that Congress can exercise its Elections
Clause authority over special vacancy-filling Senate elections because
a textual, structural, and historical analysis shows that the
Seventeenth Amendment did not create a realm of exclusive power
for state legislatures in these types of elections. This Comment also
will analyze how both existing case law and traditional tools of
statutory interpretation apply to the text of the Seventeenth
Amendment. Lastly, this Comment will argue that not only is
legislation regulating special Senate elections constitutionally
permissible, it is also preferable because of prevailing policy
concerns.
12. Id.
13. S.J. Res. 7, 111th Cong. (2009).
14. Compare H.R. 899, 111th Cong. (2009) (addressing Senate vacancies through
traditional legislation), with S.J. 7, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing a constitutional
amendment to mandate how states fill Senate vacancies).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (emphasis added).
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Part I of this Comment will provide background regarding the
ratification of the Elections Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment,
including its legislative history. Part I will also highlight the
reemergence of the direct election of Senators as a modern political
issue by discussing efforts both to repeal the Amendment and to
standardize how states fill Senate vacancies. Lastly, Part I will provide
a brief overview of the applicable methods of constitutional and
statutory interpretation used to analyze the apparent conflict between
the Elections Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment.
Part II will use this background information to analyze the
constitutionality of proposed legislation, which would mandate
uniform procedures for filling Senate vacancies in every state. First,
Part II will consider whether that type of legislation falls under
Congress’s traditional Elections Clause authority. Next, Part II will
use textual, structural, and historical analyses to discuss whether the
vacancy-filling provision of the Seventeenth Amendment changes
Congress’s Elections Clause authority over special Senate elections.
Finally, Part II will discuss why a statutory remedy is preferable to a
constitutional amendment in resolving the problems associated with
Senate vacancies.
Lastly, this Comment will summarize the information and
arguments explored in Parts I and II to conclude that a statutory
solution to the issue of Senate vacancies is both permissible and
preferable.
I.

BACKGROUND

This section traces three major themes:
(1) Congress’s
constitutional power over federal elections; (2) the Seventeenth
Amendment’s ratification journey, including the renewed interest in
the Amendment on the national political stage; and (3) the
traditional tools of constitutional and statutory interpretation.
A. Article I, Section 4: The Elections Clause
Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution—commonly called the
Elections Clause—provides that “the [t]imes, [p]laces, and [m]anner
of holding [e]lections for Senators and Representatives shall be
prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress
may at any time, by law, make or alter such Regulations, except as to
17
the places of chusing [sic] Senators.” This provision was included in
the Constitution as a check on the states’ potential to abuse their
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
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power to hold federal elections. Framers like Alexander Hamilton
worried that leaving the regulation of federal elections to the whims
19
of individual state legislatures was fraught with peril. Accordingly,
the Elections Clause represents a “broad grant of federal power . . .
20
combined with [an] unusually narrow grant of state power.”
Yet, even though the Elections Clause envisioned “a particularly
21
strong congressional role” in regulating federal elections, Congress
did not first exercise this constitutional power until 1842, when it
passed a law mandating that members of Congress be elected by
22
voting districts. Over two decades later, Congress made a similar
entreaty into federal elections by regulating when state legislatures
23
had to meet to fill U.S. Senate vacancies. Despite its early hesitation
24
to act, Congress has since enacted numerous elections regulations,
25
including establishing a national election day, mandating when
26
states must hold election for U.S. Senators, and, most recently,
establishing procedures for how states must fill vacant seats in the
27
House of Representatives.
B. Interpreting the Elections Clause
Because of a steady stream of litigation in federal court, it is now
well settled that the Elections Clause is a default constitutional
provision, meaning that states may regulate elections only insofar as
28
Congress has declined to preempt these state preferences.
This
section will explore this established general principle and how courts
have applied it to various challenges before them.
18. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 808–09 (1995) (listing
examples of the types of abuse that were “the Framers’ overriding concern” in
including the Elections Clause in the Constitution); see also Millsaps v. Thompson,
259 F.3d 535, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2001) (chronicling the Framers’ fear that states would
undermine the existence of the federal government by unfaithfully promulgating
elections regulations designed to limit the federal government’s ability to act).
19. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 301 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed.,
2009) (cautioning that leaving the power to regulate federal elections solely to the
states would “leave the existence of the Union entirely at their mercy”).
20. Election Law—Statutory Interpretation—Sixth Circuit Employs Clear Statement Rule
in Holding That the Help America Vote Act Does Not Require States to Count Provisional
Ballots Cast Outside Voters’ Home Precincts, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2461, 2467 (2005).
21. Id. at 2466.
22. 5 Stat. 491 (1842).
23. 14 Stat. 243 (1866).
24. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006) (prohibiting infringement of civil rights
during the voting process); 16 Stat. 140 (1870) (enforcing the anti-racial
discrimination guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment).
25. 2 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
26. Id. § 1.
27. Id. § 8.
28. Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997).
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1.

What can Congress “make or alter?”
The Supreme Court first interpreted the Elections Clause in its
29
1879 ruling in Ex parte Siebold. There, the Court found that the
Clause’s “make or alter” language implied a broad grant of
congressional authority over the regulation of House and Senate
30
elections.
Although the Elections Clause created concurrent
authority between the states and the federal government to regulate
congressional elections, the Court made it clear that Congress’s
31
authority in this area was “paramount.”
With Siebold laying the foundation for Elections Clause
jurisprudence, the Court has since embraced a broad grant of
congressional authority over federal elections. For instance, in its
32
1932 opinion in Smiley v. Holm, the Court re-emphasized Congress’s
33
power to supplant state election regulations as it deemed necessary.
34
More recently, in the 1997 case of Foster v. Love, the Court held that
a federal law mandating the date when general elections for the
House and Senate must be held trumped a Louisiana state law that
35
provided for a different election day.
Federal courts have also emphasized that the Election Clause’s
“make or alter” language is significant. In the 1997 case Ass’n of
36
Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Miller, the State of
Michigan argued that Congress, similar to its authority under the
Commerce Clause, had no power to compel state action where a state
37
had already established its own election regulations. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected this position,
holding that while the Commerce Clause only allows Congress to make
laws pertaining to interstate commerce, the Elections Clause
38
expressly allows Congress to make and to alter election regulations.
Therefore, the Elections Clause allows Congress to compel state

29. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
30. See id. at 384 (“When exercised, the action of Congress, so far as it extends
and conflicts with the regulations of the State, necessarily supersedes them.”).
31. Id. at 385.
32. 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
33. See id. at 366–67 (noting that Congress can make both its own elections
regulations and alter pre-existing state legislation, including being able to impose
additional sanctions or penalties beyond those that states have authorized).
34. 522 U.S. 67 (1997).
35. See id. at 69 (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832–33
(1995)) (reaffirming that it is “well-settled that the Elections Clause grants Congress
‘the power to override state regulations’ by establishing uniform rules for federal
elections, binding on the States”).
36. 129 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1997).
37. Id. at 836–37.
38. Id. at 836.

ISTA.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]
action even
39
regulations.

3/26/2012 8:09 PM

NO VACANCY
where

states

have

previously

335
enacted

contrary

2.

What are “such regulations,” and how may Congress regulate the
“[t]imes, [p]laces, and [m]anner” of holding federal elections?
In addition to interpreting the extent of Congress’s power to make
and alter federal elections regulations, federal courts also have
discussed the types of regulations that fall under this broad grant of
congressional authority. In Smiley, the Supreme Court found that the
vague phrase “such regulations” allowed Congress to regulate
anything “of the same general character” as the more specific time,
40
place, and manner regulations outlined in the Elections Clause.
The Court found that Congress could establish a “complete code for
congressional elections . . . [because Congress] has a general
supervisory power over the whole subject” of regulating national
41
42
elections. More recently, in Millsaps v. Thompson, the Sixth Circuit
held that the Elections Clause afforded Congress the power to
43
regulate essentially all procedural aspects of congressional elections.
Stated succinctly, courts have concluded that there is “national
44
authority over national elections.”
Beyond the generic “such regulations” wording, courts have
interpreted specific words within the Elections Clause, including both
“times” and “manner.” In Foster, the Supreme Court considered
whether Louisiana could hold its federal elections on a day other
45
than the one proscribed by federal law. The Court overturned the
Louisiana law and held that the “times” provision in the Elections
39. See id. (noting that the Elections Clause provides an affirmative grant of
power to Congress beyond that found in provisions like the Commerce Clause).
40. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
41. See id. at 366–67 (citations omitted) (concluding that regulations pertaining
to, inter alia, voter registration, fraud prevention, corruption mitigation, and
tabulating of election results are included in this “complete code”). But see U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 834–35 (1995) (listing approved state
regulations of election procedures).
42. 259 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2001).
43. See id. at 538–40 (framing its conclusion by couching Elections Clause case
law in terms of the Framers’ intent).
44. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 119 n.2 (1970), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. Mitchell also posits that Congress’s Elections
Clause power to regulate national elections “is augmented by the Necessary and
Proper Clause.” Id. at 120.
45. Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 68–69 (1997). Federal law sets the first Tuesday
following the first Monday in November of even-numbered years as “Election Day,”
on which elections are held for all members of the House of Representatives and for
approximately one-third of the U.S. Senate. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7 (2006). Louisiana law
had established an “open primary” system in which, essentially, these federal offices
could be filled through an election a month earlier. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
18:402(B)(1) (2004).
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Clause clearly authorized Congress to mandate uniform dates for
46
federal elections.
The term “manner” has presented a more difficult problem for
47
courts. In its 1921 decision Newberry v. United States, a divided
Supreme Court construed the term narrowly, holding that regulating
the “manner” of elections did not empower Congress to control party
48
primaries or conventions. Yet, one concurring justice in Newberry
immediately questioned this narrow reading of “manner” and called
49
Congress’s power to regulate elections “plenary.”
In 2001, the
Supreme Court suggested that it now agrees with that then-minority
50
opinion when, in Cook v. Gralike, it found that valid “manner”
regulations are those pertaining to any procedural element of
51
holding elections.
C. The Move to Popular Election of U.S. Senators
Under the original Constitution, state legislatures elected U.S.
52
Senators. In 1913, the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment
shifted that responsibility directly to the people of each state by
53
compelling the direct election of Senators. This section will explore
the events leading up to this fundamental shift, trace the legislative

46. Foster, 522 U.S. at 69; see also ACLU of Ohio, Inc. v. Taft, 385 F.3d 641, 650
(6th Cir. 2004) (finding constitutional a federal law regulating the timing of how
states must fill vacant House seats); Fox v. Paterson, 715 F. Supp. 2d 431, 437
(W.D.N.Y. 2010) (validating a federal law requiring states to decide for themselves
the timing of certain special elections for the House); supra notes 34–35 and
accompanying text (discussing Foster’s holding that federal election regulations
trump state election regulations when they conflict with one another so long as the
applicable federal regulation pertains to the times, places, or manner of holding
elections for federal offices).
47. 256 U.S. 232 (1921), abrogated by Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290
U.S. 534 (1934).
48. Id. at 258. The Court concluded that “the fair intendment of the words
[‘manner of holding elections’] does not extend so far” as to include authorizing
congressional control over electoral processes that are distinct from the actual
elections for federal offices. Id.
49. See id. at 268 (White, C.J., concurring) (explaining that this broad grant of
authority was at the very heart of the debate at the time of the Framing).
50. 531 U.S. 510 (2001).
51. Id. at 523–24. The Court identified these procedural elements as, among
other things, voter registration, vote counting, voter canvassing, and publishing
election. Id.; cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Cook v. Gralike: Easy Cases and Structural Reasoning,
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 299, 310 (2002) (positing that the result of Cook would have been
the same even without applying the Elections Clause to the questioned state law).
52. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (amended 1913) (emphasis added) (“The
Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State,
chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one vote.”).
53. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (emphasis added) (“The Senate of the United
States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof,
for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.”).
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history of the Seventeenth Amendment, discuss case law interpreting
certain provisions of the Amendment, and examine the reemergence
of the direct election of Senators as a modern political issue.
1.

In the beginning: State legislatures’ selection of U.S. Senators
As originally drafted and ratified, Article I, Section 3 ensured states
an integral role in the federal government by requiring each state
54
legislature to directly select a state’s delegation to the U.S. Senate.
The Framers’ intent was that this structure would both guarantee
55
states’ active participation in the nascent republic and, in contrast to
the House of Representatives, insulate the Senate from the whims of
56
a fickle populace.
This system faltered in the 1850s when the national tension leading
up to the Civil War spilled over into the state legislatures’ selection of
Senators, causing several Senate seats to remain vacant for extended
57
periods. These problems continued and intensified after the Civil
58
War, eventually prompting Congress to pass a law in 1866
mandating how and when each state legislature needed to select its
59
U.S. Senators. Yet problems persisted, including widespread bribery
60
and corruption. Moreover, general deadlock continued in some
54. See RALPH A. ROSSUM, FEDERALISM, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE SEVENTEENTH
AMENDMENT: THE IRONY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, 93–94 (2001) (describing
the Framers’ vision of the Senate as being designed to protect states’ autonomy); see
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison) (extolling the virtues of the
constitutional framework for the Senate, including how its members were chosen).
55. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 96–100 (detailing how state legislatures’
“instructions” to sitting Senators provided for the direct representation of state
interests in the Senate).
56. See Direct Election of Senators, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/
common/briefing/Direct_Election_Senators.htm, (last visited Nov. 14, 2011)
[hereinafter U.S. Senate webpage] (suggesting that the impact of state legislatures’
election of U.S. senators would be to insulate the senators from the temperamental
general public).
57. Id. For instance, a conflict between Southern Democrats and Northern
Republicans in Indiana left one of the state’s Senate seats vacant for two years. Id.
But see ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 181 (suggesting that the original method of
selecting Senators worked well for the first hundred years after the ratification of the
Constitution).
58. See U.S. Senate webpage, supra note 56 (noting the Civil War’s exacerbating
effect on the problems of filling Senate vacancies). Most notable among the various
conflicts in state legislatures was the case of Senator John Stockton in New Jersey,
whose Senate appointment was challenged because the New Jersey legislature
“elected” him with only a plurality of the votes. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 185–86
(discussing the calamity that ensued in the Senate after New Jersey sent Stockton to
the chamber, and its role in the body’s intense debate surrounding civil rights for
newly-freed slaves in the South).
59. See 14 Stat. 243 (1866) (requiring each chamber of state legislatures to meet
on a prescribed day to fill a vacant U.S. Senate seat and to continue meeting every
subsequent day until that seat was filled).
60. See U.S. Senate webpage, supra note 56 (noting that nine cases of bribery were
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61

state legislatures, causing forty-five deadlocks and numerous delayed
62
seatings in twenty different states from 1891 until 1905.
Proposed solutions for fixing the way Senators were appointed
63
were as old as the problem itself. However, the push for directly
electing Senators did not gain substantial momentum until the latter
part of the nineteenth century, when the Progressive movement
64
adopted it as a cause célèbre. Despite this popular demand for direct
65
election of Senators, Congress, especially the Senate, persistently
66
resisted such a structural change.
Prompted by this lack of congressional action, some states acted
67
independently to bring about direct election of their U.S. Senators.
By 1912, twenty-nine states had adopted a direct or quasi-direct
68
method to elect their Senators. As a result, the Senate gradually was
filled with Senators who were beneficiaries of, and therefore
69
supporters of, the direct election of all Senators. Because of this,
institutional support in Congress eventually shifted in favor of a
70
national change in the process of electing U.S. Senators.
publicized between 1866 and 1906). But see C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS
DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT 180 (1995)
(arguing that allegations of corruption were overblown because they were made
against only fifteen out of the 1,180 Senators elected by state legislatures between
1789 and 1909).
61. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 187–90 (charting the instances of deadlock in
state legislatures during that era).
62. See U.S. Senate webpage, supra note 56 (discussing how deadlocks and vacancies
continued after Congress’s 1866 attempt at reform and into the twentieth century).
Delaware was home to perhaps the most egregious example of this deadlock. There,
quarrels in the state legislature kept a Senate seat vacant for four years from 1899–
1903. Id.
63. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 183 (stating that the first proposal for direct
election of U.S. Senators was in 1826).
64. See HOEBEKE supra note 60, at 151–54 (characterizing the involvement of the
Progressives in pushing for direct election of Senators, including efforts by such wellknown Progressives as Wisconsin’s Robert La Follette).
65. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 183 (suggesting that the public associated direct
election of Senators with the overall goals of government reform, and that this
prompted a strong call for change among the voting populace).
66. See id. at 183 (noting that, in total, Congress considered and rejected 187
direct election resolutions before approving the Seventeenth Amendment). The
House actually passed six of those proposals before the Senate finally followed suit in
1912. Id.
67. See U.S. Senate webpage, supra note 56 (stating that Oregon led the way in
adopting this approach, with Nebraska following several years later).
68. Id.
69. See HOEBEKE, supra note 60, at 149–50 (noting that, by 1909, states’ efforts in
instituting their own direct elections of Senators had “tilt[ed] the balance in the
Senate” so that a majority of its members now supported direct election).
70. See id. at 157–61 (discussing how the pro-direct election Senators were able to
subvert their opponents’ stalling tactics by using parliamentary tools to assure that
proposed constitutional amendments had hearings before Senate committees
sympathetic to the goal of directly electing Senators).
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2.

A major shift: The Seventeenth Amendment’s legislative history
In early 1911, Representative William Waller Rucker introduced
71
House Joint Resolution 39 (H.J. Res. 39), a proposed constitutional
72
amendment requiring the direct election of all U.S. Senators. In
addition, H.J. Res. 39 contained a provision that would have
eliminated Congress’s Elections Clause authority over Senate
73
elections. After defeating an amendment that would have removed
74
this provision, the House of Representatives passed H.J. Res. 39 with
75
the two-thirds majority required for a constitutional amendment.
Days later, the Senate began to consider H.J. Res. 39 by referring it
76
to the Judiciary Committee.
Just months before, the Judiciary
77
Committee considered a virtually identical constitutional proposal;
the Committee reported out that proposal favorably to the whole
78
Senate. In its Majority Report, the Committee discussed the reasons
for, and advantages of, amending the Constitution in such a
79
significant way.
A chief reason it cited was to unshackle state
legislatures from the time-consuming (and often deadlock80
producing) process of selecting Senators. Similarly, the Majority
Report found that direct election would end the frequent Senate
81
vacancies that resulted from deadlocked legislatures. Additionally,
the Report cited the possibility (and confirmed instances) of
corruption during the selection of Senators as yet another reason to
82
amend the then-existing process of legislative appointment. Finally,
the Report concluded that direct election of Senators was the best
way to further the goals of democratic representation and to align the
Constitution with the era’s prevailing public opinion, which

71. H.J. Res. 39, 62d Cong. (1911).
72. Id.
73. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 208–11 (noting that H.J. Res. 39 provided for
“stipulated state control of elections”).
74. See id. at 211 (describing the parallels between Representative Horace Olin
Young’s proposed amendment and the Sutherland Amendment introduced in the
61st Congress, which left Congress’s Elections Clause powers intact for Senate
elections).
75. Id. at 211; see also U.S. CONST. art. V (detailing the process for amending the
Constitution).
76. ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 211.
77. S.J. Res. 134, 61st Cong. (1911).
78. S. REP. NO. 61-961 (1911).
79. Id. at 13–15.
80. See id. at 13 (speculating that states would be freer to take up the important
business of state governance if unburdened with the task of selecting U.S. Senators).
81. See id. (noting that over a dozen Senate seats had been left vacant over the
past two decades due to deadlocked legislatures).
82. See id. at 14 (positing that direct elections are easier to keep free from
corruption than the process of having legislatures select U.S. Senators).
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overwhelmingly favored popular election of Senators.
One aspect of the resolution not discussed in the Majority Report,
however, was the provision that would have stripped Congress of its
84
Elections Clause powers in the arena of Senate elections. A minority
of Senate Judiciary Committee members strongly objected to this
change and issued their own Report five months after the Committee
85
published the Majority Report.
The Minority Report noted that
altering the Elections Clause would mark a significant change to the
86
constitutional structure envisioned by the Framers. The Minority
Report found this change to be untenable and unwise, fearing that it
would result in a severe abrogation of federal power over federal
87
elections.
Accordingly, before the Senate considered H.J. Res. 39, Senator
Joseph Bristow offered a substitute resolution that omitted the
88
Elections Clause reference contained in the House version. A block
of Southern Senators opposed the omission, citing concerns over
89
federal control of Senate elections. However, the Senate ultimately
passed the Bristow Amendment, but only after the Vice President—
90
acting in his constitutional role as President of the Senate —cast a
91
Later the same day, the amended
tie-breaking vote in its favor.
resolution passed the Senate with the requisite two-thirds majority
92
vote.
Because the Senate passed an amended resolution, the issue
93
returned to the House, where debate raged on about whether states
or the federal government should have the final word in regulating

83. See id. at 14–15 (arguing that support for popular election was “almost
unanimous”).
84. See generally S. REP. NO. 61-961 (1911) (omitting any reference to the
proposal’s Elections Clause ramifications).
85. See S. REP. NO. 62-35 (1911) (dissenting from the Committee’s Majority
Report as to the clause granting exclusive elections regulation power over Senate
elections to the states).
86. See id. at 2 (asserting that, had the original Constitution called for direct
election of Senators, it also would have extended Congress’s Elections Clause
authority to those elections).
87. See id. at 2–4 (finding that altering the Elections Clause was unnecessary to
achieve the goals of direct Senate elections and that maintaining federal oversight of
all elections was more important than changing how Senators were elected).
88. ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 211.
89. Id.
90. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3 (explaining that the Vice President serves as the
President of the Senate, but that he may cast a vote only when it is necessary to break
a tie).
91. ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 211.
92. Id.
93. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (setting forth the process by which a bill becomes a
law).
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94

On a party-line vote pitting the Northern
Senate elections.
Republicans, who favored federal control, against the Southern
Democrats, who advocated for “states’ rights,” the House rejected the
95
Bristow Amendment.
This created the need for a Conference
Committee to reconcile the differences between the House and
96
Senate versions of the proposed amendment.
For nearly a year, the Conference Committee was unable to reach
97
an agreement. Frustrated by this lack of progress, the Senate urged
98
the House to accept the Bristow Amendment. By this time, even
Representative Rucker, the author of the original H.J. Res. 39 that
granted states exclusive regulatory power over Senate elections, urged
99
his House colleagues to support the Bristow Amendment. Still, the
Southern Democrats in the House continued to vehemently protest
this change, even offering their own last-minute amendment to keep
100
the federal government out of Senate elections. That amendment
failed when many members of Congress, who were sympathetic to the
Southern Democrats’ views, concluded that the Bristow Amendment
was the only way to bring about the direct election of Senators, a goal
101
these members were not willing to sacrifice.
Consequently, the
House of Representatives passed the Bristow Amendment with a twothirds majority on May 13, 1912, preserving federal oversight of
Senate elections and giving the Amendment the necessary majority in
102
both chambers of Congress.
Per Article V of the U.S. Constitution, the support of three-fourths
103
of the states was next required to ratify the proposal. This process
104
happened exceedingly fast, and, with Connecticut’s vote to ratify,
94. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 212 (providing examples of both positions).
95. See id. (noting that the final tally was 171–111 against the Bristow
Amendment).
96. See id. (discussing the process by which the Vice President, serving as
President of the Senate, appointed conferees to a special Conference Committee
tasked with reconciling the differences between the House and Senate versions of
the prospective constitutional amendment).
97. See HOEBEKE, supra note 60, at 189 (explaining that Congress was deadlocked
for eleven months after the Senate passed the Bristow Amendment).
98. See id. (stating that the Senate “resisted the temptation to reverse itself,”
instead opting to “[weary] the House into submission”).
99. ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 213.
100. See id. (detailing Representative Charles Bartlett’s amendment, which would
have set strict limits on how Congress could regulate Senate elections).
101. See id. (noting that Representative Bartlett’s amendment failed 189 to 89).
102. See id. at 213–14 (The Bristow Amendment passed the House 238 to 39.).
103. U.S. CONST. art. V.
104. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 214 (noting the Seventeenth Amendment’s
ratification took less than eleven months; only the Twelfth Amendment had been
approved quicker). The Twenty-Sixth Amendment eclipsed the Seventeenth
Amendment’s record-setting pace by securing ratification in just under four months.
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the Seventeenth Amendment was officially enshrined in the U.S.
105
Constitution on April 8, 1913.
3.

The states’ remaining power in the selection of U.S. Senators: The
Seventeenth Amendment’s vacancy-filling clause
In addition to compelling the direct election of Senators, the
Seventeenth Amendment also prescribes how Senate vacancies are to
106
107
be filled. In its 2010 decision in Judge v. Quinn, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit labeled and defined the
various parts of the Seventeenth Amendment’s vacancy-filling
language: the principal clause, which outlines the basic method for
filling Senate vacancies; the proviso, which allows for temporary
Senate appointments until a direct election can be held; and the “as
the legislature may direct” clause, which modifies the term “election”
108
in the proviso.
To facilitate easier understanding, this Comment
will adopt the Seventh Circuit’s labels.
a.

Vacancy-Filling: The principal clause

The principal clause of the vacancy-filling language states that
“[w]hen vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the
Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of
109
election to fill such vacancies.” The first part of that clause is simply
conditional, meaning that a Senate seat must first become vacant for
110
the rest of the clause to have any effect.
The second part of the principal clause articulates the result of that
111
It compels governors to issue writs of election so that
condition.
112
the vacant seat will be filled through a direct vote of the people.
The use of the word “shall” in the Amendment means that this clause
113
imposes a mandatory obligation on governors.
Id. at 229 n.143.
105. Id. at 214. Interestingly, Delaware initially voted against ratification of the
Seventeenth Amendment. See HOEBEKE, supra note 60, at 189 (noting that only
Delaware and Utah rejected the Amendment). However, the Delaware Legislature
reversed course in 2010, finally ratifying the Amendment some ninety-seven years
later. Doug Denison, Senate Takes Up 17th Amendment, Finally, DOVER POST (June 24,
2010, 5:06 PM), http://www.doverpost.com/newsnow/x41604488/Senate-takes-up17th-amendment-finally.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, para. 2.
107. 612 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011).
108. Id. at 547–51.
109. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, para. 2.
110. Judge, 612 F.3d at 547.
111. See id. (describing the chain of events triggered when the condition is met).
112. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, para. 2.
113. See Judge, 612 F.3d at 547 (discussing the plain meaning of “shall”). An
earlier Seventh Circuit decision concluded that the language in Article I, Section 2,
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Vacancy-Filling: The proviso
114

A proviso acts as an exception to a general rule.
The
Seventeenth Amendment’s proviso immediately follows its principal
clause: “Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the
executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people
115
fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.”
As a
proviso, this language acts as a limited exception to the general
vacancy-filling procedures outlined in the principal clause by allowing
state governors to temporarily fill a Senate seat until a direct election
116
can be held.
Taken together, then, the principal clause and proviso establish the
following sequence when a Senate seat is vacated: (1) a state’s
governor issues a writ of election; (2) the governor, if authorized by
state law, may temporarily appoint someone to fill the vacant Senate
seat until an election can be held; and (3) the state holds a popular
117
vote to permanently fill the vacancy.
118
However, the proviso concludes with a modifying clause —“as the
119
legislature may direct.”
The Seventh Circuit’s first Judge opinion
found that the phrase only modified the word “election,” which
120
immediately precedes it.
However, it is unclear whether this fiveword clause also affected Congress’s Elections Clause authority. A
121
thorough analysis of that question follows in Part III.
4.

Interpreting the Seventeenth Amendment
Within eight years of its ratification, the Supreme Court tackled the

which uses the term “shall,” was “mandatory according to the ordinary meaning of its
terms . . . render[ing] the issuing of the writs an indispensable duty.” Jackson v.
Ogilvie, 426 F.2d 1333, 1336 (7th Cir. 1970). The Seventh Circuit also noted that the
vacancy-filling language in the Seventeenth Amendment rendered the Senate and
House vacancy-filling procedures “functionally identical.” Judge, 612 F.3d at 547. But
see Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff’d, 393 U.S. 1124
(1969) (per curiam) (holding that “the House vacancy provision can give us no aid
in construing the Seventeenth Amendment”).
114. See LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 136 (2008)
(stating that provisos “limit the effect of a statutory provision”).
115. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, ¶ 2 (emphasis in original).
116. See Judge, 612 F.3d at 547–48 (discussing governors’ temporary appointment
power under the Seventeenth Amendment).
117. Id. at 554.
118. See id. at 549 (attempting to discern what part of the Seventeenth
Amendment the phrase “as the legislature may direct” modifies).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, ¶ 2.
120. See Judge, 612 F.3d at 550 (holding that the phrase is “best read” in this
narrow way). In doing so, the court followed the rule of the last antecedent, which
compels judges to find that limiting clauses, such as “as the legislature may direct,”
only narrowly modify the word or phrase that they immediately follow. Id.
121. See infra Part II.B (concluding that Congress can, in fact, regulate special
Senate elections pursuant to its Elections Clause authority).
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122

There, the
Seventeenth Amendment in Newberry v. United States.
Court considered whether an anti-corruption statute that placed
certain campaign spending limits on prospective federal candidates
123
was a valid “manner” regulation under the Elections Clause.
In
reaching its decision in Newberry, the Court reiterated that the
124
Elections Clause was the source of Congress’s elections authority.
Further, the Court held that the Seventeenth Amendment had not
altered the previously-accepted constitutional definition of
125
“election” and that the Elections Clause remained “intact and
126
applicable” to Senate elections.
The Court also noted that a provision altering the Elections Clause
was present when the Senate Judiciary Committee first reported out
127
the bill that would become the Seventeenth Amendment.
However, that language was excluded from the final version passed by
128
Congress and ratified by the states.
Because of this omission, the
Court concluded that Congress both considered and rejected the
notion of granting states exclusive authority to regulate Senate
129
elections.
130
In the 1968 case Valenti v. Rockefeller, a federal district court
131
analyzed the Seventeenth Amendment’s vacancy-filling provisions.
In Valenti, several New York voters sued the Governor in the
132
aftermath of the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. These
voters argued that the Seventeenth Amendment required the Senate
vacancy created by Senator Kennedy’s death to be filled through a
133
popular vote in the November 1968 general election.
A contrary

122. 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
123. Id. at 247.
124. Id. at 248.
125. See id. at 250 (defining an “election” as the “final choice of an officer by the
duly qualified electors”).
126. Id. at 252 (citing 46 CONG. REC. 848 (1911)).
127. See id. (citing S.J. Res. 134, 61st Cong. (1911)) (noting that the original
legislation included the phrase “[t]he times, places and manner of holding elections
for Senators shall be as prescribed in each state by the Legislature thereof”). The
Court stated that the “avowed purpose” of such language was to halt Congress’s
power to regulate Senate elections. Id.
128. See id. at 253 (discussing how the pertinent language was removed upon the
recommendation of a minority of members of the Senate Judiciary Committee).
129. See id. at 253–54 (suggesting that the omission of the original language that
would have given sole authority to the states was indicative of Congress’s intent to
leave the Elections Clause’s authority in place for Senate elections). For a more
detailed discussion of this legislative history, see supra Part I.C.2.
130. 292 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff’d, 393 U.S. 1124 (1969) (per curiam).
131. See id. at 862 (stating that the court was “mindful that no court [had]
previously construed the Amendment’s vacancy provision”).
132. Id. at 853.
133. Id.
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state statute set November 1970 as the appropriate date for a popular
134
election to fill that vacancy. Until that date, New York law allowed
135
the Governor to temporarily appoint someone to the Senate. The
plaintiffs argued that the two-year delay in holding a Senate election
was not a “temporary appointment” as required by the Seventeenth
136
Amendment.
The court disagreed, holding that New York’s vacancy-filling law
was within “the discretion conferred on the states by the Seventeenth
137
Amendment with respect to the timing of vacancy elections.” The
court grounded its decision in an Elections Clause analysis, finding
that New York’s law was a permissible exercise of states’ initial
138
“[t]imes, [p]laces, and [m]anner” authority under that provision.
Furthermore, the court held that the Seventeenth Amendment left
139
In a
the Elections Clause unaltered as to vacancy-filling elections.
per curiam decision, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the
140
lower court’s ruling in Valenti.
In the early 1990s, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit analyzed the Seventeenth Amendment in Trinsey v.
141
Pennsylvania.
Like Valenti, this case followed the tragic death of a
142
sitting Senator. A prospective candidate for that then-vacant Senate
seat sued the state’s Governor, asserting that Pennsylvania’s law
allowing political parties—rather than a popular vote—to nominate
143
Senate candidates violated his Seventeenth Amendment rights.

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 854.
138. See id. at 856 (discussing how a “natural reading” of the Seventeenth
Amendment compels an application of the Elections Clause).
139. See id. (commenting that had the drafters of the Amendment wanted to
radically alter the Election Clause’s application to vacancy-filling elections, they
would have applied the same type of clear language used to change how Senators
were elected). But see id. at 862 (suggesting that the Seventeenth Amendment left
discretion over vacancy-filling election procedures solely to the states). Notably, this
would be a stark departure from the traditional understanding of the Elections
Clause, which courts have found to be a default provision granting states regulatory
authority over elections only insofar as Congress has declined to act. See, e.g., Foster
v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) (noting Congress’s preemptory power under the
Elections Clause).
140. Valenti v. Rockefeller, 393 U.S. 405 (1969) (per curiam).
141. 941 F.2d 224 (3rd Cir. 1991). This case has been discussed extensively in
scholarly work. See, e.g., Kevin M. Gold, Trinsey v. Pennsylvania: State Discretion to
Regulate United States Senate Vacancy Elections and the Standards for Judicial Scrutiny, 2
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 199, 212–18 (1992–1993) (analyzing the impact of the Trinsey
decision on state Senate vacancy-filling laws).
142. See Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 225 (discussing how Senator John Heinz died in a
plane crash in early 1991).
143. Id. at 226.
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The court disagreed, finding that the Seventeenth Amendment did
not require states to hold primary elections before a general election
144
to fill a Senate vacancy.
To reach this conclusion, the court considered the Seventeenth
Amendment’s legislative history but found that it lacked significant
145
discussion about the Amendment’s vacancy-filling provision.
Consequently, the court turned to precedent, including Valenti, to
infer that the Seventeenth Amendment left states the discretion to
146
determine the electoral procedures for filling Senate vacancies.
Furthermore, the court noted that the vacancy-filling provision in the
Seventeenth Amendment twice referred to state legislatures,
indicating Congress’s intent to allow states to determine how they fill
147
Senate vacancies.
Accordingly, the Third Circuit upheld
148
Pennsylvania’s law.
The recent Rod Blagojevich fiasco in Illinois brought the
Seventeenth Amendment back to federal court in 2010. In its first
Judge opinion, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the
Seventeenth Amendment required Illinois’s Governor to issue writs
of election to fill a Senate vacancy, or whether state law mandating
the precise date of a special Senate election was sufficient to meet the
149
commands of the Amendment.
In deciding that question, the
court extensively examined the Seventeenth Amendment’s vacancy150
filling provision.

144. Id. at 234.
145. See id. at 231 (noting the court’s surprise at the comparative lack of legislative
history pertaining to sudden vacancies, which provided “no guidance . . . as to the
course to be followed in the present circumstance”).
146. See id. at 233 (citing Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 866 (S.D.N.Y.
1968)) (insisting that “as the legislature may direct” was clear evidence that the
drafters of the Seventeenth Amendment intended to let states choose their own
vacancy-filling elections procedures).
147. See id. at 234 (speculating that even though certain lawmakers failed in their
attempts to overturn Congress’s general Election Clause authority, the Seventeenth
Amendment’s emphasis on state legislatures in its vacancy-filling provision is
“dispositive” evidence that states are empowered as regulators of special Senate
elections). However, this language was used only to justify the court’s finding that
legislatures, not governors, had the ultimate authority to enact a statute providing for
temporary Senate appointments if a vacancy occurred. See id. (discussing the role
legislatures play in empowering governors to temporarily appoint someone to the
Senate).
148. Id. at 236.
149. See Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the
plaintiffs had preserved their right to appeal whether it was constitutionally required
for Illinois Governor Pat Quinn to issue writs of election for the state’s pending
Senate vacancy, and if so, whether he was required to hold that election on the
earliest date possible), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011).
150. Id. at 547–55; see also supra Part I.C.3 (outlining the structure and labels
adopted by the Seventh Circuit).
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Through this exhaustive look into the Amendment, the court
found that, inter alia, states’ power to regulate special Senate elections
151
was still rooted in, and limited by, the Elections Clause. Thus, the
court found that the Seventeenth Amendment “was not intended to
152
change the Elections Clause of the original Constitution.”
Therefore, the Seventeenth Amendment, in concert with the
Elections Clause, requires that states enact procedures for vacancy153
filling Senate elections.
In Illinois, the legislature met its
Seventeenth Amendment obligations by mandating a specific
154
election day for any vacancy-filling Senate elections; however, the
Seventh Circuit also found that the Governor was required to issue
formal writs of election to meet his obligations under the
155
Amendment.
The Seventh Circuit quickly reaffirmed this ruling in the
156
subsequent case of Judge v. Quinn,
in which Roland Burris
challenged a district court-ordered permanent injunction—issued in
response to the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in the first Judge v. Quinn—
compelling Illinois to hold a special Senate election on a specified
157
date.
Senator Burris asserted that Illinois state law violated his
constitutional rights by excluding his name from the ballot in the
primary election to determine candidates in the 2010 Senate general
158
election. With little discussion, the court found that the Illinois law
was within the permissible realm of state action authorized by the
Seventeenth Amendment and the Elections Clause, a result
159
consistent with its previous ruling on the district court’s injunction.

151. See Judge, 612 F.3d at 550 (noting that the Seventeenth Amendment is not the
only source of state authority to promulgate rules for filling Senate vacancies;
instead, the Elections Clause lays the foundation for all elections regulations).
152. See id. at 552–53 (noting that because the Seventeenth Amendment was
added to the Constitution after the Elections Clause, it could have expressly modified
that earlier provision).
153. See id. at 554 (summarizing states’ obligations under the Elections Clause).
154. See id. at 541 (affirming the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ requested
injunction).
155. See id. at 554–55 (clarifying that even if he lacked any discretion over when to
hold a special election, the Governor was required to issue writs of election because
they gave formal notice to voters, set the electoral process in motion, and ensured
that the special election would actually occur on the prescribed day).
156. Judge v. Quinn, 624 F.3d 352, 354 (7th Cir. 2010).
157. Id.
158. See id. at 360–61 (noting that Roland Burris failed to support his claim that
his non-appearance on the ballot was an actionable constitutional violation).
159. See id. at 359 (discerning that the phrase “as the legislature may direct” and
the Elections Clause connote ample discretion upon states to enact election
regulations like the disputed Illinois law).
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5.

Debate over the Seventeenth Amendment today
Nearly a century after ratification, the controversy concerning
certain provisions of the Seventeenth Amendment has reemerged as
160
a hotly-debated political topic. This surprising renaissance includes
debate over two distinct provisions of the Amendment. First, the
conservative-leaning Tea Party movement has called for a return to
the era of state legislatures selecting U.S. Senators. Second,
embarrassing political scandals and the fear of a mass-casualty
terrorist attack wiping out large numbers of elected officials has
prompted general concern over how Senate vacancies are filled.
Both issues are discussed below.
a.

The Tea Party’s push to repeal the Seventeenth Amendment

In early 2009, a conservative political movement called the “Tea
161
Party” emerged on the national political stage.
Among other
162
goals, the Tea Party generally supports what it believes is a strict
adherence to the structure of federalism outlined in the Constitution,
which Tea Party supporters assert only delegates limited enumerated
powers to the federal government and leaves everything else to the
163
discretion of the states. During the 2010 election season, some Tea
Party supporters used this “states’ rights” platform to call for the
164
repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment.
At least two Tea Partybacked congressional candidates pledged to support repeal if
160. See Matt Bai, Tea Party’s Push on Senate Election Exposes Limits, N.Y. TIMES, June
2, 2010, at A4 (noting that this once-dormant issue made a surprising return to the
political debates in 2010 congressional campaigns).
161. See Lexington, Anger Management: Some Americans are Getting Mad as Hell, THE
ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 2009, at 42 (discussing both how the Tea Party was, in part,
spawned after an on-air rant from a “previously obscure [television] journalist,” and
how anger over perceived “bail out[s]” of certain American industries, like banking
and automobile manufacturing, formed the basis of the Tea Party’s political
ideology).
162. See Russell Berman, Gallup: Tea Party’s top concerns are debt, size of government,
THE HILL (July 5, 2010, 5:45 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefingroom/news/107193-gallup-tea-partys-top-concerns-are-debt-size-of-government
(showcasing poll results that found Tea Party supporters primarily were concerned
about the federal budget deficit and the size of the federal government).
163. See Kirk Johnson, States’ Rights is Rallying Cry of Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2010, at A1 (noting how some groups in the Tea Party movement are pressuring
lawmakers to support bills that these groups believe reflect the limited role of federal
government required by the Tenth Amendment and other constitutional
provisions).
164. See Evan McMorris-Santoro, Tea Party-Backed Repeal of the 17th Amendment Gets
Republicans Into Trouble, TALKING POINTS MEMO (May 14, 2010, 4:13 PM),
http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/05/tea-party-call-to-repeal-the-17thamendment-causing-problems-for-gop-candidates.php (describing proponents of
repeal as “a vocal part” of the Tea Party movement, who believe repeal would
maximize individual and state liberty).
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165

elected. A sitting Republican member of Congress with ties to the
Tea Party movement even introduced legislation calling for a
constitutional convention to strike the Seventeenth Amendment and
166
to restore to state legislatures the function of voting for Senators.
Supporters of repeal believe the Seventeenth Amendment has
usurped the Framers’ intent that the states have an integral part in
167
the functioning of the federal government. In the opinion of many
affiliated with the Tea Party, the direct election of Senators has given
Congress unfettered power over the states, which consequently has
168
left states vulnerable to federal action, such as unfunded mandates.
Conversely, supporters of the Seventeenth Amendment have
suggested that the Tea Party is too quick to dismiss the motivations
behind the initial ratification of the Amendment, namely corruption
169
and deadlock in state legislatures.
These supporters argue that
special interest groups will gain undue influence over Senators if the
170
selection process is returned to state legislatures. Although calls for
repeal remained an ancillary issue during the 2010 election cycle, the
relative success of Tea Party-backed candidates in the 2010 midterm
171
elections likely means that states’ rights, possibly including a
165. See id. (identifying Republicans Steve Stivers and Vaughn Ward as
congressional candidates who, at least initially, supported repeal of the Seventeenth
Amendment).
166. See Eric Kleefeld, Gohmert: Fight Health Care Bill by Repealing Popular Election of
Senators,
TALKING
POINTS
MEMO
(Mar.
23,
2010,
2:21
PM),
http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/03/gohmert-fight-health-care-bill-byrepealing-popular-election-of-senators-video.php
(reporting on Representative
Louie Gohmert’s plan to return Senate elections to the pre-1913 model).
167. See McMorris-Santoro, supra note 164 (summarizing repeal supporters’ belief
that popular election of Senators has undermined the notion of limited federal
government by depriving states of the power to protect their interests in
Washington).
168. See Bai, supra note 160 (distilling the general pro-federalism argument
espoused by advocates of repealing the Seventeenth Amendment); see also Tea Party’s
Target Not Just the 17th Amendment, Add 14th as Well, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y BLOG
(June 7, 2010), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/tea-party’s-target-not-just-the-17thamendment-add-14th-as-well (noting that the Tea Party’s states’ rights platform has
also targeted reform, or repeal, of the Fourteenth Amendment, especially as it
pertains to birthright citizenship).
169. John A. Farrell, The Stupidest Tea Party Idea: Repeal the 17th Amendment, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT THOMAS JEFFERSON ST. BLOG (June 1, 2010),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/john-farrell/2010/6/1/tea-party-goesoverboard-by-suggesting-to-repeal-17th-amendment.html
(synthesizing
the
Progressive Era arguments in support of ratifying the Seventeenth Amendment in
1913).
170. See id. (arguing that the robber barons and party machines of the latenineteenth and early-twentieth centuries will reemerge in modern forms if state
legislatures are again entrusted with a key role in shaping who serves in Congress).
171. Five candidates affiliated with Tea Party groups won seats to the U.S. Senate
in 2010; over forty Tea Party-supported candidates were elected to the House of
Representatives. Alexandra Moe, Just 32% of Tea Party Candidates Win, MSNBC FIRST
READ (Nov. 3, 2010, 4:34 PM), http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2010/
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renewed push to repeal the Seventeenth Amendment, will remain a
contentious political topic for the foreseeable future.
b.

Current issues surrounding U.S. Senate vacancies

Beyond the general debate over whether states or the people
should elect U.S. Senators, a particularized debate over what should
happen when those Senate seats become vacant also exists. In part,
this debate focuses on continuity of government principles, which
deal with how the United States government would continue to
function in the event of a major catastrophe that causes mass
172
Since the terrorist attacks of
casualties among elected officials.
September 11, 2001, government officials have been especially
173
In fact, these
concerned with this type of contingency planning.
concerns prompted federal legislation that outlined how vacancies in
the House of Representatives were to be filled in special
174
circumstances, such as a terrorist attack. However, Congress has yet
to pass a similar measure for filling Senate vacancies after a mass
175
casualty event.
Accordingly, it seems likely that Congress will one
day attempt to address this potential deficiency in the federal
continuity of government plan.
Terrorism concerns notwithstanding, several high-profile Senate
11/03/5403120-just-32-of-tea-party-candidates-win.
172. See generally About the Commission, CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N,
http://www.continuityofgovernment.org/about/about.html (last visited Nov. 14,
2011) (noting the Commission studies how to maintain the operations of all three
federal branches of government in the event of a major terrorist attack, natural
disaster, or some other catastrophe).
173. See William M. Arkin, Back to the Bunker . . . Or, How Washington Learned to Love
the Shelter All Over Again, WASH. POST, June 4, 2006, at B1 (discussing the federal
government’s largest-ever continuity of government drill, which was planned and
executed because of post-9/11 concern over how the federal government would
respond to mass casualties in an age of global terrorism).
174. See Michael Stern, The Constitutionality of the ELECT Act, POINT OF ORDER BLOG
(Mar. 14, 2009, 5:13 PM), http://www.pointoforder.com/2009/03/14/theconstitutionality-of-the-elect-act/ (discussing the vacancy-filling mechanisms in 2
U.S.C. § 8 (2006), which provided special rules for House elections held under
“extraordinary circumstances”).
175. The authority for 2 U.S.C. § 8, the House mass-casualty provision, is clearly
grounded in the Elections Clause. See id. (identifying the constitutional basis for the
legislation). However, because of the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment,
many lawmakers seem unsure of the constitutionality of similar federal legislation to
address potential mass casualties among Senators. See Vikram David Amar & Michael
Schaps, The Proposal to End Gubernatorial Appointments of Replacement Senators: Reform in
This Area May Be Needed, But the Feingold Constitutional Amendment Needs More Thought,
FINDLAW (Mar. 13, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20090313.html
[hereinafter Amar & Schaps] (suggesting that questions persist over whether the
Seventeenth Amendment precludes Congress from exercising its Elections Clause
authority over special Senate elections); see also infra Part II.C.3 (analyzing the answer
to those questions).
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vacancies have generated national headlines in recent years. The
2008 election of President Barack Obama and Vice President Joseph
Biden, along with President Obama’s appointment of several Cabinet
176
secretaries, created four Senate vacancies in a matter of weeks. Less
than a year later, Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy’s death
177
created another high-profile vacancy.
Each of these vacancies had a unique subtext. In Delaware, the
Governor appointed Ted Kaufmann, a former staff member to Vice
178
President Biden, to the Senate.
At the time, political observers
viewed Kaufman as a “seat warmer” who merely would hold Vice
President Biden’s old seat until his son, Beau Biden, could run for a
179
full term in 2010.
In Colorado, the Governor appointed Michael
Bennet, who was criticized because he had never before run for any
180
In New York, prominent media figures accused
public office.
181
182
Governor David Paterson of “dithering” and acting “peculiar”
during the process that ultimately resulted in Kirsten Gillibrand’s

176. See Editorial, How Not to Pick a Senator, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2009, at A12
(listing the Senate vacancies proximately caused by President Obama’s election).
Following the 2008 election, Illinois (vacated by Obama), Delaware (vacated by
Biden), New York (vacated by Hillary Clinton when she was appointed Secretary of
State), and Colorado (vacated by Ken Salazar when he was appointed Secretary of
the Interior) all experienced sudden Senate vacancies. Id.
177. See John M. Broder, Causes Defined Him, Even at End, at 77, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
27, 2009, at A1 (noting Senator Kennedy’s passing after a long struggle with brain
cancer).
178. See Kate Phillips, Biden’s Replacement Sworn In to the Senate, N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS
BLOG (Jan. 16, 2009, 12:21 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/
bidens-replacement-sworn-in (discussing Kaufman’s official start to his brief Senate
career).
179. See Will Robinson, Duke Alumnus Picked for Biden’s Senate Seat, CBS NEWS (Feb.
11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/11/26/politics/uwire/
main4633986.shtml (noting that Kaufman announced he would not seek election to
the full Senate term in 2010, prompting speculation that he was keeping the seat
warm for Beau Biden). But see Charles Mathesian, Beau Biden declines Senate Bid,
POLITICO (Jan. 25, 2010, 9:45 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
0110/31952.html (reporting that Beau Biden opted not to run for his father’s old
Senate seat in 2010).
180. See Steven K. Paulson, Michael Bennet Appointed Colorado Senator, Will Replace
Ken
Salazar,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Jan.
3,
2009,
8:59
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/03/michael-bennet-appointed_n_155009.html (discussing Colorado Governor Bill Ritter’s surprising choice of a
“dark horse candidate” lacking legislative or campaigning experience).
181. See Maureen Dowd, Which Governor is Wackier?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, at
WK11 (accusing Governor Paterson of taking too long and changing his mind too
frequently during the Senate appointment process, which included, in Dowd’s
opinion, his poor handling of the prospective appointment of Caroline Kennedy to
the vacant seat).
182. See Chris Smith, The Zany Adventures of (Senator) Caroline Kennedy, N.Y.
MAGAZINE (Feb. 2, 2009), at 16 (criticizing Governor Paterson for the way in which
he filled Hillary Clinton’s vacant Senate seat).
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183

In Massachusetts, Republican Scott
appointment to the Senate.
Brown’s surprising special election win marked the national
184
emergence of the Tea Party movement. The saga of disgraced exGovernor Rod Blagojevich in Illinois, however, is likely to remain the
most infamous and egregious example of the problems surrounding
185
how Senate vacancies are currently filled.
Motivated in part because of this noteworthy string of recent
Senate vacancies, federal lawmakers recently introduced legislation
186
addressing this issue.
On January 29, 2009, Senators Russell
Feingold, Mark Begich, and John McCain proposed a constitutional
amendment to create a uniform national method for filling Senate
187
vacancies.
The proposed amendment would prevent all
gubernatorial appointments to the Senate, instead requiring all
188
sitting Senators to be elected directly by the people.
Just days later, Representative Aaron Schock introduced a bill
designed to tackle the Senate vacancies problem without taking the
189
drastic step to amend the U.S. Constitution.
Unlike the Senators’
proposed amendment, the ELECT Act would still allow state
governors to make temporary Senate appointments, but it would
mandate that special vacancy-filling elections occur within ninety days
190
of a seat vacancy.
In addition, the ELECT Act would provide
federal funding to a state to mitigate its financial burden in holding
191
prompt special elections.

183. See Nicholas Sabloff, Kirsten Gillibrand: New York’s Next Senator, HUFFINGTON
POST, (Jan. 22, 2009, 8:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/22/
kirsten-gillibrand-new-yo_n_160195.html (noting how Governor Paterson settled on
a sitting member of New York’s delegation to the House of Representatives to
replace Hillary Clinton in the Senate).
184. See Charles Krauthammer, The Meaning of Brown, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2010, at
A21 (opining that the Brown Senate election victory reflected the national power of
the Tea Party to shape campaigns and to drive voter turnout).
185. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (chronicling the events in Illinois
after Barack Obama vacated his Senate seat).
186. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 7 and H.J. Res. 21: A Constitutional Amendment Concerning
Senate Vacancies: Joint Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on the Constitution and the H.
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 111th Cong. 12-13 (2009)
(written testimony of Rep. Aaron Schock) (suggesting that he was motivated to
propose federal legislation creating a uniform process for filling Senate vacancies
because the current system is “riddled with the possibility of fraud, abuse, and
outright bribery,” which he saw firsthand in his home state of Illinois during the
Blagojevich saga).
187. S.J. Res. 7, 111th Cong. (2009).
188. Id.
189. Compare id. (proposing a constitutional amendment to address the problem
of Senate vacancies), with H.R. 899, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing a legislative,
rather than constitutional, solution to the problem).
190. H.R. 899, 111th Cong. (2009).
191. Id.
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D. Theories of Constitutional Interpretation and Statutory Construction
This Comment utilizes the traditional tools of constitutional
interpretation and statutory construction to analyze the apparent
tension between portions of the Seventeenth Amendment and the
192
Elections Clause. Accordingly, a brief introduction to the theories
and tools that will be utilized in this Comment is in order here.
1.

Introduction to the textual approach
Textualism is a formalistic approach to constitutional
interpretation that relies exclusively on the ordinary meaning of the
text of any given constitutional provision to interpret that provision’s
193
In doing so, the textual approach dismisses virtually all
meaning.
inquiries into non-textual sources, including canons of construction
194
and legislative history. Instead, the key question that textualists ask
is how a reasonable person would ordinarily understand the words of
195
a certain provision.
196
In a 1987 concurrence in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, Justice Antonin
197
Scalia—perhaps the most well-known modern textualist —
articulated his jurisprudential approach to textualism. In CardozaFonseca, the Court ruled that the Immigration and Nationality Act
only required asylum applicants to demonstrate a “well-founded fear
of persecution,” which the Court found was a different and lower

192. See infra Part II.B.1–3 (interpreting the text of the Seventeenth Amendment
and Elections Clause using traditional tools of constitutional and statutory
construction).
Constitutional provisions can be considered “super statutes,”
meaning that, while the tools of statutory interpretation are by no means dispositive
in analyzing constitutional amendments, their general principles are certainly
applicable and relevant to any analysis. RONALD B. BROWN & SHARON J. BROWN,
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 16–17 (2002).
193. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 14 (1991) (outlining the
contours of the textual modality of interpretation); Ian Gallacher, Conducting the
Constitution: Justice Scalia, Textualism, and the Eroica Symphony, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 301, 306 (2006) (noting that “textualism requires a devotion to the text above all
other considerations”); see also Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 22 (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1997) (defending his view of textualism by stating that “[t]he text is the law, and
it is the text that must be observed”).
194. See Gallacher, supra note 193, at 307 (noting that “[any] interpretation going
beyond the text’s meaning is impermissible”).
195. See BOBBITT, supra note 193, at 25–26 (demonstrating how a textual argument
is made by analyzing Article VI in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution through
the lens of an average contemporary American’s understanding of the text). Bobbitt
also refers to this as the “man on the street” approach. Id. at 12.
196. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
197. See Gallacher, supra note 193, at 306–07 (bestowing upon Justice Scalia the
title of “most influential” textualist by virtue of his position on the Supreme Court).
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The majority
standard than the one that INS had been using.
opinion cited the Act’s legislative history at length in reaching its
199
conclusion, even though the majority also felt its interpretation of
200
“well-founded fear” reflected the plain meaning of that term.
Justice Scalia agreed with the result of the case, but he strongly
201
objected to the majority’s reliance on legislative intent.
Justice
Scalia felt that the Court’s analysis should have ended when it
determined the plain meaning of “well-founded fear,” rather than
202
further inquiring into the law’s legislative history. Thus, for Justice
Scalia, textualism was the only approach to constitutional
interpretation needed in this case because, “[w]here the language
of . . . laws is clear, [judges] are not free to replace it with unenacted
203
legislative intent.”
The plain meaning theory is to statutory interpretation what
204
textualism is to constitutional interpretation.
Like textualism, the
plain meaning approach uses the ordinary meaning of words,
205
grammar, and punctuation to dictate statutory interpretation.
While the plain meaning approach does not look to external sources
of interpretation, it sometimes will use dictionary meanings and
linguistic canons of construction—those that explain how to apply
the normal rules of the English language to the law—to discern the
206
ordinary meaning of text.
The plain meaning approach also buttresses the canon of
construction that disfavors creating surplusage or redundancy within
207
a law.
This canon presumes that legislators carefully draft all
198. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449–50.
199. See id. at 434–35 (noting that the Act’s legislative history indicated that
Congress did not seek to modify a prior standard it had been using for refugee
determinations).
200. See id. at 450 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that “the very language of
the term ‘well-founded fear’” compelled the majority’s reasoning in this case).
201. See id. at 452 (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that “wellfounded fear” had a clear, plain meaning, but imploring the Court to stop its analysis
there rather than delving into the Act’s legislative history).
202. See id. (calling the Court’s legislative intent analysis “an ill-advised deviation
from the venerable principle that if the language of a statute is clear, that language
must be given effect—at least in the absence of patent absurdity”). Justice Scalia
expressed further concern that the majority’s insistence at looking into legislative
history would be a cue to other courts that such a practice was appropriate or even
required in all cases. Id. at 453.
203. Id. at 453.
204. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 17 (defining the plain meaning approach as the
statutory interpretation counterpart to textualism).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 104 (defining the canon against surplusage to mean that in a properlyinterpreted statute, “every word has meaning; nothing is redundant or
meaningless”).
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208

therefore, each word in a statute must have an
statutes;
independent meaning, and no words should be viewed as
209
duplicative.
The Supreme Court has validated this general
principle by declaring that it has the “duty to give effect, if possible,
210
to every clause and word of a statute.”
Sometimes, however, applying the plain meaning of words in a
statute creates a result unintended by the legislature. Hence,
statutory interpreters have developed the absurd result exception to
211
the plain meaning rule.
The Supreme Court first articulated this
212
exception in the 1892 case Holy Trinity Church v. United States, which
centered on a federal anti-immigration statute banning businesses
from bringing anyone into the country “to perform labor or service
213
of any kind.”
Consequently, when a church hired a pastor from
214
England, the federal government fined the church.
However, the
Court rejected the lower court’s holding that the law’s application to
215
work “of any kind” was clear, plain language.
Instead, the Court
held that denying a church the right to recruit pastors from overseas
216
would be an absurd result. The Court famously concluded that “a
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the
statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
217
makers.” This rationale opened the door for other jurists to look
beyond the clear text of a statute when that analysis would produce a
218
similarly absurd result.
208. See id. (positing that, if legislators would have found extra or useless words in
a statute, they would have deleted them before passing the law).
209. But see BROWN & BROWN, supra note 192, at 86 (noting Judge Easterbrook’s
position that “redundancy is common in statutes; . . . [not] every enacted word must
carry independent force”).
210. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
211. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 71 (deeming this exception the “Golden Rule”
of statutory interpretation).
212. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
213. Id. at 458. The Court noted “of any kind” was included in the statute to
“guard against any narrow interpretation and emphasize a breadth of meaning.” Id.
214. Id. at 457–58.
215. See id. at 458–59 (“While there is great force to this reasoning, we cannot
think Congress intended to denounce with penalties a transaction like that in the
present case.”).
216. See id. at 471–72 (finding that Congress did not intend for the outcome
advocated by the Government because America’s “laws,” “business,” “customs,” and
“society” along with “unofficial declarations” and “organic utterances” suggest that
“[the United States] is a Christian nation,” and it would be absurd to think that
Congress intended to categorize contracts for foreign Christian ministers as
misdemeanors).
217. Id. at 459.
218. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 71 (noting that, with Holy Trinity’s recognition
of an “absurd result” exception, “the Golden Rule was born”). The Holy Trinity Court
itself listed several external sources helpful in analyzing legislative intent. See Holy
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2.

Introduction to the structural approach
In contrast to the strict constraints of textualism, structuralism
considers the relationships among various constitutional provisions to
discern the meaning of a given provision within the context of the
219
whole document.
This approach particularly applies to the
constitutional principles of “federalism, separation of powers, and
220
democracy.”
As such, structuralism has been used to analyze
controversies ranging from the scope of Congress’s power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to the limits of Congress’s Commerce
221
Clause authority.
222
The Supreme Court’s 2005 opinion in Granholm v. Heald provides
a recent example of structuralism. In Granholm, the Court resolved a
conflict between the Twenty-First Amendment and the Dormant
223
Commerce Clause.
Michigan law criminalized the shipment of
wine from out-of-state wineries directly to Michigan residents but
224
allowed in-state wineries to ship directly to Michigan homes.
Michigan argued that this law was a permissible exercise of its Twenty225
First Amendment power to regulate liquor inside the state.
Opponents of the law argued that it violated the Dormant Commerce
Clause because the Michigan statute discriminated against out-of-state
226
wine sellers.
The Court relied on structural arguments in siding with these
227
opponents and striking down the Michigan law.
The Court held
Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 465 (suggesting an act’s title, the “evil which was intended
to be remedied,” Congress’s impetus for acting, and congressional committee
reports as persuasive sources of legislative history).
219. See BOBBITT, supra note 193, at 14–15 (defining the structural modality of
constitutional interpretation).
220. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
THE BASIC QUESTIONS 117 (2007).
221. See id. at 121–30 (providing examples of the Supreme Court’s use of
structuralism to analyze constitutional questions).
222. 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
223. Id. at 471. The Twenty-First Amendment overturned the Eighteenth
Amendment’s prohibition of alcohol, and, in doing so, gave states the power to
regulate “the transportation or importation” of liquor. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
Although not expressly written into the Constitution, the Dormant Commerce
Clause stands for the proposition that the explicit Commerce Clause, located in
Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution, prevents states from passing laws that
burden or discriminate against interstate commerce.
See generally James L.
Buchwalter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Dormant Commerce Clause, U.S.
Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3—Supreme Court Cases, 41 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1, 13–15 (2009)
(defining and explaining the Dormant Commerce Clause’s application).
224. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 469.
225. Id. at 469, 473–74.
226. Id. at 469.
227. See id. at 484–86 (discussing the relationship between the Twenty-First
Amendment and the Commerce Clause).
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that no language in the Twenty-First Amendment was meant to
empower states to violate the long-standing Dormant Commerce
228
Clause. It emphasized that the Dormant Commerce Clause was an
important part of the Constitution’s federalist structure, and that it
prevented states from passing laws discriminating against one another
229
in the realm of interstate commerce. The Court concluded that the
passage of the Twenty-First Amendment was not intended to upset
230
that balance.
Analogous to structuralism is the statutory construction canon of in
pari materia, which requires that new statutes be interpreted
consistently with older legislation regarding the same subject
231
matter.
Like structuralism, in pari materia emphasizes context in
232
Accordingly, in pari materia
interpreting legislative language.
promotes consistency and coherency among various provisions within
233
legislation.
In pari materia has two separate, but related, components: the
234
whole act aspect and the whole code aspect. The whole act aspect
requires individual sections of legislation to be interpreted within the
235
236
context of the whole statute. In Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., the North
Carolina Supreme Court used this aspect to interpret the meaning of
the word “defendant” in a punitive damages statute, which capped
237
such damages at $250,000.
There, the defendant corporation
argued that this figure was the maximum total punitive liability it
could face in any one lawsuit, regardless of the number of plaintiffs
238
jointly suing in the same case. Citing the maxim of in pari materia,
the court rejected this position, finding that other clauses within the
same statutory section referred to “a verdict” and “the award” as the
228. Id. at 486. The Court noted that “the Twenty-First Amendment does not
supersede other provisions of the Constitution and, in particular, does not displace
the rule that States may not give a discriminatory preference to their own
producers.” Id.
229. Id. at 472–73.
230. See id. at 493 (overturning the Michigan winery law because even though the
Twenty-First Amendment gave states broad regulatory power, the Court’s Commerce
Clause rulings require regulation to be done in an even-handed way, which was not
the case with Michigan’s law).
231. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 99–100 (noting that in pari materia literally
means “part of the same material”).
232. The whole statute maxim articulates a similar idea. See BROWN & BROWN,
supra note 192, at 89–90 (defining the whole statute maxim to mean that legislation
should be read as a whole, rather than as individual provisions).
233. JELLUM, supra note 114, at 100.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. 594 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 2004).
237. Id. at 7.
238. Id. at 19.
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239

Therefore, the
operative words regarding maximum damages.
court held that the statute was meant to cap each plaintiff’s individual
240
punitive damages award, not to limit a defendant’s total liability.
Accordingly, it rejected the defendant’s attempt to read one part of
the statute in isolation from the rest of it because such an
241
interpretation would contravene the principles of in pari materia.
Similar to the whole statute aspect, the whole code aspect of in pari
materia asserts that new statutes must be read in harmony with
242
existing legislation about the same subject.
This aspect relies on
the presumption that legislatures are aware of all previous statutes
regarding a certain subject matter when they enact a new law
243
pertaining to that same subject. The Supreme Court has validated
the whole code aspect, finding that in pari materia applies when two
244
statutes “[b]oth deal with precisely the same subject matter.”
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
followed this Supreme Court dictate in the 2000 case Florida Sugar
245
Marketing & Terminal Ass’n v. United States.
The court interpreted
the meaning of the term “export” to mean only commerce done with
246
foreign entities.
In reaching that conclusion, the court read the
Constitution’s Export Clause in context with other constitutional
247
provisions relating to commercial activities.
Through its analysis,
the court rejected the petitioner’s argument because accepting it
would have created inconsistencies among other constitutional
clauses pertaining to commerce, namely the Commerce Clause
248
itself. Thus, the court opted to interpret the term “export” in pari
materia with all other constitutional provisions relating to
249
commerce.

239. Id. at 20.
240. Id. at 21.
241. See id. at 19 (holding that the court “[did] not agree with K-Mart’s argument”
regarding how the statute capped damages).
242. JELLUM, supra note 114, at 100.
243. Id. at 101.
244. United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940).
245. 220 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The court noted that constitutional
provisions “should be interpreted to avoid contradictions in the text.” Id. at 1337.
246. See id. at 1338–39 (finding that the Export Clause only applies to “foreign
commerce, not interstate shipments”).
247. See id. at 1337 (“Reading the Export Clause in light of other clauses of the
Constitution provides additional indications that the Framers intended it only to
limit federal powers with regard to foreign commerce.”).
248. Id.
249. See id. at 1337–38 (recognizing the need to interpret the term “export”
consistently with the Exports Clause and the Commerce Clause).
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3.

Introduction to the historical approach
Like structuralism, the historical approach to constitutional
250
interpretation, which is closely aligned with originalism, looks
beyond the plain text of the Constitution by analyzing the original
intent of the drafters and ratifiers of the Constitution and its
251
amendments.
The theory holds that when provisions of the
Constitution are ambiguous, courts should look to how the drafters
and ratifiers of those provisions generally understood them at the
252
time they were added to the Constitution.
Under this approach,
looking beyond the drafters’ and ratifiers’ original intent risks the
courts creating, changing, or repealing constitutional provisions—a
job that supporters of the historical approach believe is reserved for
253
Congress and state legislatures through the ratification process.
The Supreme Court applied the historical approach in its 1983
254
Marsh v. Chambers decision. In that case, the Court held that the
Nebraska Legislature did not violate the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause when it began each legislative session with a
255
chaplain-led prayer.
Though the literal text of the First
Amendment suggested that this practice violated the Establishment
256
Clause, the Court found that that was not the original intent of the
257
Instead, the Court traced the history of
Amendment’s framers.
legislative chaplains back to the First Continental Congress and the

250. See BOBBITT, supra note 193, at 12 (defining the historical approach). See also
SCALIA, supra note 193, at 38 (articulating his understanding of the theory of original
intent).
251. See BOBBIT, supra note 193, at 12 (identifying the relevant inquiry under the
historical approach).
252. Id. at 12–13.
253. E.g., Todd S. Purdum & Robin Toner, Roberts Pledges He’ll Hear Cases With
“Open Mind”, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005, at A1 (discussing Chief Justice John
Roberts’s judicial philosophy, which he articulated during his Senate confirmation
hearing). Chief Justice Roberts analogized the courts to the game of baseball,
opining “that it’s [his] job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.” Id. But
see Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, Judges Do Make Law—It’s Their Job, USA
TODAY, Aug. 23, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-0823-forum-judges_x.htm# (rejecting the originalists mantra against “legislating from
the bench”). Chemerinsky and Fisk instead argue that all judges must make law
because that process is at the heart of the common law system, which governs areas
like tort law, contract law, and property law. Id. The authors also suggest that the
very doctrine of judicial review, which gives judges the authority to declare laws
unconstitutional, was made up by judges. Id.
254. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
255. Id. at 786.
256. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added) (stating that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion”).
257. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788 (observing that the First Amendment’s drafters did
not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a First Amendment
violation because such practices had occurred since Congress’s first session).
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First Congress, which ratified the First Amendment. Therefore, the
Court concluded that the framers of the Establishment Clause did
not intend for it to preclude chaplain-led prayers before the start of
259
legislative sessions, meaning Nebraska’s customary practice was
260
constitutionally permissible.
In the field of statutory interpretation, the historical approach is
261
most often called intentionalism.
To intentionalists, the
legislature’s motivation and specific intent in passing a law are of
262
paramount importance. In discerning that intent, a court looks to
the legislative history of a statute, even if the text of that statute is
263
Intentionalists have outlined a hierarchy of the
unambiguous.
extrinsic sources of legislative history, ranging from the most
persuasive to the least persuasive: conference committee reports;
regular committee reports; earlier versions of a bill, including
rejected amendments; statements made by the bill’s supporters
during its floor debate, with special consideration sometimes given to
the bill’s drafters and sponsors; and, finally, statements made by the
264
bill’s opponents during floor debate.
When analyzing legislative intent, courts strongly disfavor statutory
265
This
interpretations that would result in repeal by implication.
canon of construction presumes that when legislatures want to repeal
266
a pre-existing law, they only do so expressly.
Accordingly, judges

258. See id. at 786–91 (chronicling the history of legislative chaplains in colonial
America).
259. See id. at 790 (noting that it would have been odd for the Framers of the First
Amendment, who had just opened their own legislative session with a chaplain-led
prayer, to simultaneously declare such a practice unacceptable under the First
Amendment).
260. Id. at 794–95.
261. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 22–23 (explaining the role of original intent in
statutory interpretation).
262. Id. at 23.
263. See id. (contrasting textualism, which only begrudgingly looks to extrinsic
sources when statutory language is ambiguous, with intentionalism, which embraces
extrinsic sources of interpretation even when a statute’s plain meaning seems clear).
264. See id. at 161–65 (identifying and explaining this hierarchy). Some
intentionalists also consider post-enactment history, such as presidential signing
statements and veto messages. Id. at 164. However, neither of those sources are
technically legislative history since they come from the executive branch of
government. Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
265. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 192, at 94–95 (citing Radzanower v. Touche Ross
& Co., 426 U.S 148, 154 (1976)) (noting that the issue of implied repeal typically
arises when one plausible interpretation of an ambiguity within a new statute would
implicitly overturn a provision in a pre-existing law, but the legislature or Congress
neglected to expressly address this apparent conflict).
266. JELLUM, supra note 114, at 146. However, Jellum also notes that this is a
“potentially flawed presumption.” Id.
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are very hesitant to interpret ambiguous statutory language so as to
267
implicitly repeal another law.
268
In the 1974 case Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court utilized
this canon to reconcile a conflict between the Indian Reorganization
Act (IRA) of 1934 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
269
(EEO) of 1972.
The IRA required that Native Americans receive
special hiring preference for positions in the Bureau of Indian
Affairs; the later-enacted EEO mandated that all federal personnel
270
decisions be made without racial prejudice. However, the EEO did
not contain an expressed repeal of the old IRA preference
271
Because the Court disfavors repeals by implication, it
provision.
272
ruled that the EEO did not implicitly repeal the IRA. Instead, the
Court reconciled the contradictory statutes by holding that the IRA
preference was an implied exception to the EEO because both laws
were aimed at tackling racial discrimination in the federal
273
workplace.
Consequently, the Court upheld the principle of
274
disfavoring repeals by implication.
II. A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND ELECTIONS CLAUSE SHOWS THAT CONGRESS MAY
REGULATE VACANCY-FILLING U.S. SENATE ELECTIONS
The recent controversies surrounding U.S. Senate vacancies and
the subsequent congressional attempts to legislate the issue prompt
the question of whether Congress has ultimate authority to mandate
how states fill these vacancies or whether the Seventeenth
Amendment exclusively delegated this power to the states. This
section analyzes that question by examining prior case law on the
subject and applying traditional methods of constitutional and
statutory interpretation to the competing clauses at issue.

267. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 192, at 94–95 (warning courts not to
interpret an ambiguous statutory provision so as to effectively repeal another law).
268. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
269. See id. at 538 (observing that the IRA’s preferential language created the
central conflict in the case following the EEO’s subsequent enactment).
270. See id. at 537–38, 542, 545 (explaining the requirements of each federal law).
271. See id. at 550 (noting the “congressional silence” in the EEO as to whether it
repealed the IRA).
272. Id. at 550–51. The Court categorized its decision as the “prototypical case
where . . . repeal by implication [was] not appropriate.” Id. at 550.
273. Id. But see JELLUM, supra note 114, at 147 (suggesting that this reconciliation
was disingenuous). This canon does not mean, however, that courts never recognize
an implied repeal. See id. (insisting that specific evidence of Congress’s intent to
implicitly repeal a law can overcome this canon’s general thrust).
274. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 146–47 (categorizing Morton as “[o]ne of the
more famous cases addressing implied repeal”).
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Although it never passed Congress, the 2009 ELECT Act serves as a
useful proxy for analyzing the extent of congressional authority in
this area. Specifically, it is useful to consider whether the legislation’s
275
mandate to schedule special elections within a narrow timeframe
after a Senate seat becomes vacant falls within the scope of both the
Elections Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment. However, this
Comment is not simply an analysis of the constitutionality of the
proposed ELECT Act; rather, it analyzes more generally the
principles enumerated in that Act, i.e., Congress’s constitutional
authority to regulate vacancy-filling Senate elections.
A. Enactment of Federal Regulations of Senate Vacancy-Filling Elections
Would Be a Permissible Exercise of Congress’s Elections Clause Authority
Federal authority to regulate elections for federal offices is limited
to the power delegated to Congress in the Elections Clause, which
authorizes Congress to regulate the “[t]imes, [p]laces, and
276
[m]anner” of holding federal elections.
Therefore, momentarily
setting aside any changes that the Seventeenth Amendment may have
made to this Clause, any federal legislation mandating how states fill
Senate vacancies must fall within the Election Clause’s broad grant of
277
authority.
Accordingly, analysis of prospective federal legislation
regarding Senate vacancies must start with whether the legislation
278
represents a valid exercise of Congress’s Elections Clause powers.
1.

There is no distinction in the Elections Clause between regular and
special U.S. Senate elections
Just as Congress is authorized to pass laws concerning regularlyscheduled Senate elections, it can also mandate the timing and
279
Textually,
procedure of special elections to fill Senate vacancies.
the Elections Clause makes no distinction between general, regularlyscheduled elections, and special elections required to fill sudden
275. See H.R. 899, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (mandating that states hold a special
Senate election within ninety days of a seat becoming vacant).
276. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see also infra Part I.A–B (detailing the parameters
of congressional power under the Elections Clause).
277. See, e.g., Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 554 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing the
Elections Clause as the basis for both state and federal regulatory power over
elections), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011).
278. See Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 258 (1921) (striking down a law
governing party primaries and conventions because it was not within the “manner”
provision of the Elections Clause), abrogated by Burroughs & Cannon v. United States,
290 U.S. 534 (1934).
279. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (arguing that “nothing in the text of the
Seventeenth Amendment . . . distinguishes regular popular [Senate] elections from
vacancy-filling popular elections”).
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280

vacancies. Thus, textualists would likely have no problem applying
281
the Elections Clause to both regular and special Senate elections.
A structural analysis confirms this lack of distinction. As the Court
found in Newberry, the word “election,” as used throughout the
Constitution, simply means the “final choice of an officer by the duly
282
qualified electors.” Both regular and special elections represent the
283
voters’ final choice.
Therefore, creating a distinction between
regular and special Senate elections would subvert the Framers’
structural design.
Additionally, Congress itself has previously adopted this
284
understanding of the Elections Clause.
It has already passed
285
election regulations both for regularly-scheduled elections and for
286
Moreover, prior to the passage of
special vacancy-filling elections.
the Seventeenth Amendment, Congress applied its Elections Clause
powers to Senate vacancies through an 1866 act regulating the timing
and manner of how state legislatures must appoint U.S. Senators both
287
in the event of regular and unexpected vacancies. Accordingly, any
new federal legislation mandating how and when states fill Senate
vacancies fits squarely into this established congressional
understanding of its Elections Clause authority.
The principle of in pari materia bolsters this conclusion. As the
whole code aspect of that canon instructs, the same word is to be
interpreted to have the same meaning throughout an entire code of
288
laws, such as the Constitution. Hence, just as the term “export” was
interpreted to have a consistent meaning among all constitutional

280. Id.
281. See Gallacher, supra note 193, at 307 (“Any interpretation going beyond the
text’s meaning is impermissible.”).
282. Newberry, 256 U.S. at 250.
283. Article I, section 2 uses the term “election” (and variations thereof) to
describe both the general election procedures for electing Congressmen and the
more particularized procedures for electing Representatives to fill sudden House
vacancies. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1–2 (outlining the general election
procedures and qualifications for House members), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4
(outlining the procedures for elections held to fill House vacancies). After a dulyheld election, whether regularly-scheduled or otherwise, members of Congress serve
their complete respective terms, subject only to expulsion by a two-thirds vote of
either the House or Senate. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
284. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7–9 (2006) (creating various federal election regulations
pertaining to both regular and vacancy-filling congressional elections).
285. See id. §§ 1, 7 (regulating the timing of Senate elections and establishing a
national “Election Day” in November of even-numbered years).
286. See id. § 8 (regulating the timing of special elections to fill House vacancies
occurring during “extraordinary circumstances,” such as terrorist attacks).
287. 14 Stat. 243–44 (1866).
288. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 100 (noting that “[i]n pari materia promotes
coherence,” especially in reference to statutes).
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provisions pertaining to commerce in Florida Sugar Marketing, the
term “election” should have the same meaning regardless of where it
289
appears in the Constitution.
Therefore, to infer a distinction
between special and general Senate elections would violate the
principle of in pari materia, a result disfavored by the Supreme
290
Court.
2.

Congress is authorized to preempt state elections laws, including those
outlining the timing of special U.S. Senate elections
From as early as its Siebold decision in 1879, the Supreme Court has
recognized that Congress has “paramount authority” to promulgate
291
Thus, that each state has already
federal elections regulations.
established its preferred method for filling Senate vacancies is of no
consequence. The Supreme Court has consistently held that federal
laws trump state laws in this area under Congress’s Elections Clause
292
power to “make or alter” election regulations.
Therefore,
legislation like the ELECT Act would be a valid expression of
Congress’s power to “alter” existing state election regulations and
would trump any pre-existing state laws with different processes for
293
filling Senate vacancies.
Courts have made it clear that this congressional power to override
state laws broadly extends to all laws relating to the procedural
294
aspects of the electoral process.
The setting of a special election

289. See Florida Sugar Mktg. & Terminal Ass’n v. United States, 220 F.3d 1331,
1337–39 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (using structural analysis to find that “export” should be
interpreted in pari materia with other provisions of the Constitution relating to
commerce, such as the Commerce and Exports Clauses); JELLUM, supra note 114, at
101 (explaining, for example, that one statute criminalizing certain behavior should
be read in pari materia with statutes criminalizing the same or similar type of
behavior).
290. See United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940) (holding that statutes
should be interpreted in pari materia when they “[b]oth deal with precisely the same
subject matter”).
291. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 385 (1879).
292. See Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) (overturning a state law that
contradicted a federal statute mandating a uniform day for federal elections); Smiley
v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366–67 (1932) (asserting the supremacy of federal law over
state law in the realm of elections regulation); Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now
v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 836–37 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that the word “alter” in the
Elections Clause grants to Congress broad authority to override state election
regulations where Congress sees fit to do so).
293. See, e.g., Foster, 522 U.S. at 69 (exemplifying the Court’s understanding of how
the Election Clause allows Congress to alter pre-existing state laws; the Court termed
the issue “well settled”).
294. See Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366–67 (finding that Congress has the power to
regulate a “complete code” over the “whole subject” of elections); Millsaps v.
Thompson, 259 F.3d 535, 538–40 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that Congress can
regulate “nearly every procedural aspect of a federal election”).
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day is one of those procedural aspects. For instance, in Foster the
Supreme Court upheld a federal law requiring a uniform national
election day for federal offices because that regulation fit squarely
295
into the “times” provision of the Elections Clause.
The ELECT Act requires that special Senate elections be held
296
within ninety days of a seat vacancy.
This ninety-day requirement
can be readily analogized to existing federal elections laws, which
were interpreted in Foster, requiring that Senators be elected on the
first Tuesday following the first Monday in November in the year
immediately preceding the expiration of a sitting Senator’s term in
297
office.
Both laws mandate when states must hold elections for
federal office. Therefore, a prospective federal law like the ELECT
Act, which only relates to the procedural aspects of voting, would be
within the accepted reach of congressional authority under the
298
Elections Clause.
B. The Seventeenth Amendment’s Vacancy-Filling Provision Did Not Alter
Congress’s Broad Elections Clause Authority
As the Supreme Court explained in Newberry, the Seventeenth
Amendment “neither announced nor require[d] a new meaning of
election” that would change any of the above analysis of Congress’s
299
Elections Clause authority.
Thus, it is generally assumed that
Congress can still invoke its Elections Clause authority over Senate
elections even in the wake of passage of the Seventeenth
300
Amendment. However, the wording of the Amendment’s vacancyfilling provision leaves ambiguity as to whether that result is also true
301
for special Senate vacancy-filling elections.
Thus far, this Comment’s analysis has mostly (and deliberately)
295. Foster, 522 U.S. at 69.
296. H.R. 899, 111th Cong. § 2(a)(2) (2009).
297. Compare H.R. 899, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (setting Senate vacancy-filling
elections exactly ninety days after a seat becomes open), with 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7 (2006)
(setting the precise date for general Senate elections), and Foster, 522 U.S. at 69–70
(upholding one standardized election day as a valid exercise of Congress’s Election
Clause authority).
298. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (discussing that Congress already
regulates regular Senate elections via the Elections Clause and concluding that the
Seventeenth Amendment did not alter its power to extend this authority to vacancyfilling elections).
299. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 250 (1921), abrogated by Burroughs &
Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
300. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (touting the general agreement among
scholars that the Elections Clause applies to regularly-scheduled Senate elections).
301. See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text (discussing the modifying
clause “as the legislature may direct” at the end of the proviso in the Seventeenth
Amendment).
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ignored the “as the legislature may direct” clause. However, that
clause represents the strongest argument that the Seventeenth
Amendment usurped federal authority to regulate vacancy-filling
Senate elections by giving states exclusive power to regulate these
302
This section explores the evidence supporting and
elections.
refuting that notion.
1. The textual approach suggests that states are the exclusive regulators of
vacancy-filling U.S. Senate elections
Textualism only considers the ordinary meaning of the text in any
303
Thus, a textualist would ask what a
given constitutional provision.
reasonable person understands the words “as the legislature may
304
direct” to mean.
Examining only the words of the Seventeenth
Amendment, it seems that such a reasonable person would conclude
that only state legislatures have dominion over special vacancy-filling
305
Senate elections. In fact, the vacancy-filling provision says nothing
306
about Congress, but it specifically references state legislatures’
307
authority to direct special Senate elections.
308
For jurists like Justice Scalia, the analysis would end there.
Following his logic in Cardoza-Fonseca, Justice Scalia would look only
309
to the plain meaning of “as the legislature may direct.” Since that
phrase is arguably unambiguous, Justice Scalia and fellow textualists
310
would argue that no further inquiry is needed, and would bristle at
any examination of extrinsic sources, such as the Amendment’s
311
legislative history.
Therefore, ardent textualists would claim that

302. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 174 (noting that the author was originally skeptical
of federal forays into Senate vacancy-filling laws because he feared that the “as the
legislature may direct” clause precluded legislation like the ELECT Act).
303. See BOBBITT, supra note 193, at 12 (explaining that the textualist uses the
perspective of the “average contemporary ‘man on the street’” to interpret text).
304. Id.
305. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (conceding that the phrase does “suggest
that state legislatures enjoy discretion” over vacancy-filling elections).
306. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 2 (omitting any reference to the federal
government).
307. See id. (thrice referencing the power of state actors, be it governors or
legislatures).
308. See SCALIA, supra note 193, at 22 (declaring unequivocally that “the text is the
law, and it is the text that must be observed”).
309. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(chastising the Court for looking to legislative history even though it concluded the
phrase in question had a clear meaning). Justice Scalia added that “judges interpret
laws rather than reconstruct legislators’ intentions.” Id. at 452–53.
310. Cf. id. at 453 (cautioning the Court against setting the precedent that lower
courts should consider legislative intent even where statutory text is unambiguous).
311. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 17 (noting that textualists close the door on
nearly all supplemental sources of legislative intent).
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the Seventeenth Amendment made states the exclusive regulators of
312
special Senate elections.
This plain meaning approach to constitutional interpretation also
urges that the Seventeenth Amendment be interpreted to avoid
313
surplusage or redundancy.
Each word and phrase in the
314
Amendment should have independent meaning or significance.
Therefore, to avoid the strictures of the canon against surplusage, “as
315
the legislature may direct” must mean something.
Surely the clause does mean something if viewed as an exclusive
grant of power to state legislatures to regulate special Senate
elections. In that instance, “as the legislature may direct” would
mean that Congress’s traditional Elections Clause authority does not
316
extend to special Senate elections.
As a result, that interpretation
renders the clause anything but superfluous or redundant.
However, if that interpretation is not correct, the question becomes
whether “as the legislature may direct” means anything at all. One
possible alternative explanation is that it is merely a reminder of state
legislatures’ initial authority to promulgate elections regulations
317
under the Elections Clause.
A second possibility is that the clause
does not pertain to the relationship between Congress and state
legislatures, but rather to the relationship between state legislatures

312. See, e.g., Rick Hasen, Illinois Scandal Spawns a Debate: Amendment Would End
Appointments,
ELECTION
LAW
BLOG
(Mar.
11,
2009,
9:10
PM),
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013171.html (suggesting that Professor
Hasen’s initial reaction to the proposed ELECT Act was that it was unconstitutional
because the ordinary and plain understanding of the “as the legislature may direct”
language is that it does not authorize Congress to regulate vacancy-filling elections).
313. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 104 (explaining how statutes should generally
be interpreted to avoid creating duplicity or meaninglessness).
314. Id.
315. See Vikram David Amar, Reforming the Way Senate Vacancies are Filled: A Q & A
About the Proposed Constitutional Amendment and the “ELECT Act” Bill, FINDLAW (Mar.
27, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20090327.html (acknowledging this
concern by offering alternative possibilities as to what “as the legislature may direct”
means). But see JELLUM, supra note 114, at 104 (contending that legislative drafting is
often a sloppy process and that legislators rarely waste time arguing over possibly
redundant language); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and
in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 812 (1983) (explaining that legislation is
typically the result of political compromise, enhancing the likelihood of meaningless
redundancies). Posner’s observation seems particularly relevant to the Seventeenth
Amendment, which took several different forms before Congress ultimately passed it.
See supra Part I.C.2 (detailing the Amendment’s legislative history).
316. See Stern, supra note 174 (outlining the general parameters of the Elections
Clause and noting how interpreting “as the legislature may direct” as an exclusive
grant of state power would change that general understanding).
317. Amar, supra note 315. Amar suggests that, under Article 1, section 4, state
legislatures have the power to regulate all congressional elections “in the first
instance.” Id. (emphasis added).
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318

In that sense, the clause can be read as
and state governors.
clarifying that legislatures, not governors, are tasked with setting
319
special Senate election procedures.
Given these two distinct
possibilities, then, the canon against redundancy and surplusage does
not doom an interpretation of “as the legislatures may direct” that
320
leaves the Elections Clause intact.
Additionally, even if “as the legislature may direct” is unambiguous
language, interpreting it to deprive Congress of the power to regulate
special Senate elections could be considered an absurd result because
depriving Congress of that power would be contrary to Congress’s
321
intent in passing the Seventeenth Amendment.
As its legislative
history makes clear, Congress passed the Seventeenth Amendment to
322
give state legislatures less, not more, power.
Yet construing the “as
the legislature may direct” clause to give these legislatures an
exclusive realm of power over special Senate elections produces the
exact opposite result because state election laws are generally subject
323
to congressional override under the Elections Clause.
324
The Holy Trinity doctrine illustrates this as well. Finding that “as
the legislature may direct” is an exclusive grant of power to the states
may be a plausible reading of the language—one “within the letter of
325
the statute.”
However, the Holy Trinity doctrine counsels that a
plausible reading of the language is not dispositive in interpreting a
326
given provision. Instead, a correct interpretation should be “within
327
[the] spirit” of the law and “within the intention of its makers.”
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See id. (answering the question of why the Seventeenth Amendment referred
to state legislatures at all by positing two plausible reasons for the inclusion of the “as
the legislature may direct” clause at the end of the vacancy-filling portion of the
Amendment).
321. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 71 (noting that the rationale of the so-called
“Golden Rule” of statutory interpretation allows judges to ignore plain meaning if
such an interpretation would not be reflective of legislative intent).
322. See supra Part I.C.2 (chronicling the Seventeenth Amendment’s long path to
ratification).
323. See Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 549 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that “the
Congress that drafted the [Seventeenth] [A]mendment was consciously changing
the system [of electing Senators] from one that was in the hands of the legislature to
a new one”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). The court refused to believe that the
same Congress that passed the Seventeenth Amendment simultaneously reintroduced the state legislature as the exclusive authority over special Senate
elections. Id.
324. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
325. See id. at 459 (cautioning that a statute can contain language that nonetheless
conflicts with the purpose of, or intentions behind, the statute).
326. See id. (The Holy Trinity Court continued to interpret the disputed provision
even though its plain meaning was “within the letter of the law”).
327. Id.
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Here, the spirit of the Seventeenth Amendment and the intention of
its drafters were to severely restrict state legislatures’ power over
Senate elections, not to give the legislatures unlimited discretion in
328
Accordingly, this application of the Holy
filling Senate vacancies.
Trinity “absurd result” exception would allow a court to look beyond
329
the text of the Seventeenth Amendment.
Instead, judges could
consult extra-textual sources to interpret the meaning of the
330
Amendment consistently with the goals of its framers.
2. The structural approach indicates that Congress has regulatory authority
over vacancy-filling U.S. Senate elections because that result is necessary to
maintain consistent interpretation between the Elections Clause and the
Seventeenth Amendment
Structuralism is one way to look beyond the mere text of the
Seventeenth Amendment.
The approach focuses on the
relationships inferred from the structure and context of the whole
331
The
Constitution, particularly in the area of federalism.
relationship between state and federal power, a basic question of
federalism, is at the heart of the controversy over whether states have
332
exclusive authority to regulate special Senate elections.
Additionally, resolving this issue requires analyzing how a laterenacted constitutional provision authorizing state action affects a
previously-enacted provision authorizing federal action, which adds
333
another layer to the basic federalism question. Since these types of
334
questions are particularly amenable to structural analysis, it follows
that structuralism is particularly relevant to the conflict between the
328. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the motivations of lawmakers in fundamentally
changing how Senators are elected).
329. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 71 (stating that once a court invokes the absurd
result exception, judges can interpret ambiguous language to reflect the intent of
the legislature even if that interpretation flies in the face of the plain meaning of the
statute’s text).
330. Id.
331. See BOBBITT, supra note 193, at 14–15 (defining the structural modality of
constitutional interpretation); see also BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 220, at 117
(listing some of the most pertinent areas where structuralism is applied).
332. See generally Andreas Follesdal, Federalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Mar. 9, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/federalism/ (defining federalism
as the “divi[sion] [of] powers between member units and common institutions). In
the United States, the federal government is the common institution, while states are
the member units.
333. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (alluding to the conflict between the
Seventeenth Amendment and the Elections Clause as one in which a subsequent
constitutional amendment provided states with explicit power to do something they
previously lacked any authority to do).
334. See BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 220, at 117 (identifying federalism as one of
“[t]he Constitution’s leading structural principles”).
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335

Elections Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment.
In 2005, the Supreme Court undertook a similar type of structural
336
analysis in Granholm v. Heald.
The Court held that states’ powers
under the later-enacted Twenty-First Amendment did not trump
federal powers contained in the earlier-recognized Dormant
337
Commerce Clause.
In its decision, the Court emphasized the
Dormant Commerce Clause’s importance to the Constitution’s
338
Consequently, the Court found that even
federalism structure.
though the Twenty-First Amendment affirmatively authorized states
to regulate alcohol within their borders, it should not be interpreted
to overturn the limits that the Dormant Commerce Clause places on
these regulations, including its prohibition of state laws that
339
discriminate against out-of-state commercial interests or producers.
A similar analysis is appropriate to the tension between the
Seventeenth Amendment and the Elections Clause. The Twenty-First
Amendment allows states to regulate alcohol, while the Seventeenth
Amendment allows states to regulate special Senate election
340
procedures.
Additionally, the previously-enacted Elections Clause
limits that state authority, just as the earlier-recognized Dormant
Commerce Clause limited the scope of state authority under the
341
Twenty-First Amendment.
Moreover, both conflicts involve the
proper allocation of power between the states and the federal
342
Federal authority overrides state authority when the
government.

335. See Amar, supra note 315 (suggesting that analysis of the structure of the
Constitution is one pertinent way in which to analyze a proposed law like the ELECT
Act).
336. 544 U.S. 460, 484–86 (2005).
337. See id. at 466 (holding that Michigan’s winery law violated the Dormant
Commerce Clause and that that type of violation was not authorized by potentially
contradictory language in the Twenty-First Amendment).
338. Id. at 472–73.
339. Id. at 484–86.
340. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (abolishing federally-mandated Prohibition
and returning to the states the right to regulate alcohol), with U.S. CONST. amend
XVII (giving states the power to regulate the process of filling Senate vacancies by
directing governors to issue writs of election and allowing state legislatures to
empower the governor to make temporary appointments until the seats are filled by
election).
341. Compare, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (granting states broad power to regulate
elections but reserving to Congress the right to “make or alter such Regulations”),
with Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 199 (1824) (generally prohibiting state regulation
of interstate commerce, a power that is reserved to the federal government). Justice
O’Connor later explained the concepts behind the Dormant Commerce Clause,
acknowledging them to be a creature of judicial origin that “not only empowers
Congress to regulate interstate commerce, but also imposes limitations on the States
in the absence of congressional action.” C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,
511 U.S. 383, 401–02 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
342. Amar & Schaps, supra note 175.
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Constitution clearly delegates power to the federal government.
Since the Constitution explicitly gives Congress the power to issue
federal elections regulations, its authority should supersede that of
the states on this issue. Therefore, just as the Granholm Court held
that the Twenty-First Amendment did not overturn the Dormant
Commerce Clause, a structural analysis shows that the Seventeenth
Amendment’s “as the legislature may direct” clause likely did not
overturn Congress’s “make or alter” powers under the Elections
344
Clause.
Accordingly, the Court’s holding in Granholm provides
persuasive precedent in any potential challenge to federal legislation
like the ELECT Act.
Similar to the precedential holding in Granholm, the statutory
construction maxim of in pari materia provides another structural
analysis tool. This canon requires that equivalent statutory terms and
345
phrases be interpreted consistently.
It is premised on the
assumption that when legislatures pass a law, they are aware of all
346
previously-enacted statutes dealing with the same subject.
That presumption is confirmed in this instance. The Seventeenth
Amendment’s legislative history shows that both houses of Congress
were well aware that the Elections Clause gave Congress default
347
authority to regulate Senate elections.
In fact, some lawmakers
repeatedly attempted to overturn that federal authority using the
348
language of what would become the Seventeenth Amendment.
However, those lawmakers were ultimately unsuccessful, and the
Amendment passed without any repeal of Congress’s Elections Clause
349
authority over Senate elections.
Accordingly, since Congress
possessed direct knowledge of prior elections provisions in the
Constitution when it ratified the Amendment, the “as the legislature
may direct” clause should be interpreted consistently with those
350
provisions, including the Elections Clause itself.
343. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466 (noting the supremacy of the Commerce Clause in
reaching the conclusion that Michigan’s winery law was unconstitutional).
344. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (analogizing the holding in Granholm to a
potential court case interpreting the conflict between the Seventeenth Amendment
and the Elections Clause).
345. JELLUM, supra note 114, at 99–100.
346. Id.
347. See HOEBEKE, supra note 60, at 189 (noting the protracted fight over whether
the states or Congress should regulate Senate elections).
348. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 213 (discussing Representative Bartlett’s failed
amendment as the last gasp of Southern Democrats hoping to remove Congress from
the role of Senate elections regulator).
349. Id. at 213–14.
350. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (identifying the particular relevance of
this subjective understanding of the framers’ intent when analyzing the Seventeenth
Amendment).
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By faithfully applying in pari materia, the “as the legislature may
direct” clause should be interpreted harmoniously with the rest of the
351
Seventeenth Amendment (the whole act aspect)
and other
constitutional provisions covering the same general subject of federal
352
elections (the whole code aspect). Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp. provides a
useful framework for how courts might apply the whole act aspect of
353
in pari materia. There, the North Carolina Supreme Court invoked
in pari materia to decide whether a state statute capped punitive
354
damages at $250,000 per plaintiff or per defendant. In its analysis,
the court cited other language within the same statute as evidence of
the structures set out in the statute, which this court concluded was a
355
plaintiff-centered law. The court used these internal structural cues
to conclude that the quarter-million dollar damages cap referred to
each plaintiff’s maximum award rather than to the highest
cumulative total that could be assessed against any individual
356
defendant.
The Seventeenth Amendment has a similar internal structural cue.
The first sentence of the Amendment makes clear that its goal is to
357
empower people, not legislatures, to elect senators.
Thus, this
Amendment shifted the election of U.S. Senators from states’
358
legislatures to states’ voters.
In that sense, the Seventeenth
359
Amendment is a narrowing of state power.
However, interpreting
“as the legislature may direct” to mean that states are the sole arbiters
of election regulations for special Senate elections would be a vast
360
expansion of previously understood state power.
This
interpretation would ignore the Seventeenth Amendment’s structure
by placing its two major provisions—how Senators are elected and
361
how vacancies are filled—in conflict with one another. Instead, by
351. JELLUM, supra note 114, at 100.
352. Id. at 101.
353. Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 594 S.E.2d 1, 20 (N.C. 2004).
354. Id.
355. Id. at 20–21.
356. Id. at 19.
357. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1 (emphasis added) (stating that senators would
be elected from each state “by the people thereof”).
358. Compare U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 1 (amended 1913) (directing that state
legislatures select senators), with U.S. CONST., amend. XVII, § 1 (emphasizing that
each state’s senators would be elected “by the people thereof”).
359. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 219–20 (bemoaning states’ loss of power after
the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment).
360. See Amar, supra note 315 (noting that from as early as 1866, Congress
recognized that it had ultimate authority over vacancy-filling Senate elections and
that state regulations were subject to being overridden by contrary federal rules).
361. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (speculating that the default position in
this debate is to apply the Elections Clause to all Senate elections, including those to
fill vacancies).
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interpreting “as the legislature may direct” in pari materia with the rest
of the Seventeenth Amendment, it does not give states any exclusive
power, meaning that the Elections Clause would still apply to all types
of Senate elections.
Outside of this internal consistency within the Seventeenth
Amendment, the “as the legislature may direct” clause also ought to
be interpreted in pari materia with other constitutional provisions
pertaining to elections, as this is the thrust of the whole code aspect
362
of the canon.
As the Supreme Court has held, in pari materia
applies when two provisions “[b]oth deal with precisely the same
363
subject matter.” This command was closely followed in Florida Sugar
Marketing, which interpreted the term “export” consistently with
364
other constitutional provisions related to commercial activity.
The whole code aspect likewise can apply here because the
Elections Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment both deal with
365
“precisely the same subject matter”—elections for federal offices.
As the Florida Sugar Marketing court ensured internal harmony
amongst provisions relating to commerce within the Constitution, the
Seventeenth Amendment similarly can be interpreted to maintain
harmony among the Amendment and other constitutional provisions
pertaining to federal elections, namely the Elections Clause. That
harmonious interpretation would apply the Elections Clause to all
congressional elections and reject the notion that special Senate
366
elections are solely within state legislatures’ jurisdiction.
3.

The historical approach counsels that Congress can regulate vacancyfilling U.S. Senate elections because that result was the intention of the
Seventeenth Amendment’s framers
Like structuralism, the historical approach to constitutional

362. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 100 (distinguishing the whole code aspect from
the whole act aspect by concluding that the whole code aspect seeks harmony among
all laws concerning the same general subject matter).
363. United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940).
364. See Florida Sugar Mktg. & Terminal Ass’n v. United States, 220 F.3d 1331,
1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (viewing the term “export” in context with “the entirety of
the relevant constitutional text,” including Article 1, section 8, clause 1 and the
Exports Clause).
365. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (pertaining to the relationship between
states and the federal government in regulating elections for Congress, including the
Senate), with U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (outlining the process by which U.S. Senators
are elected).
366. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (rejecting any exclusive authority in the
“as the legislature may direct clause” by positing that a consistent interpretation of
that clause with other constitutional provisions “provides no barrier to statutes like
[the] ELECT Act”).
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367

along with the intentionalist approach to statutory
analysis,
368
interpretation, also allows for looking beyond just the text of
constitutional language. These approaches use the motivations and
understandings of a provision’s drafters and ratifiers to guide the
369
interpretation of the provision. Thus, the intentions of the framers
of the Seventeenth Amendment—why they drafted the provision and
what they understood it to mean—are essential in conducting an
370
originalist analysis.
In discerning this intent, the Amendment’s legislative history
371
provides a window into its framers’ minds.
As noted earlier, the
372
Seventeenth Amendment by no means sailed through Congress.
Rather, it was the subject of intense debate, both within congressional
373
committees and on the floor of the House and Senate.
When
trying to discern the meaning of the Amendment, this legislative
history is instructive to understand what Congress actually intended
374
the Seventeenth Amendment to do.
Traditionally, conference committee reports provide the most
375
conclusive evidence of legislative history.
Therefore, the Senate
Judiciary Committee’s Majority and Minority Reports are among the
most persuasive documents in the Seventeenth Amendment’s cache
376
of legislative history.
The Majority Report clearly articulated
367. See supra Part I.D.3 (summarizing the historical and intentionalist
approaches).
368. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 22–23 (explaining that discerning legislatures’
specific intent is the primary inquiry in any intentionalist analysis).
369. Id.; BOBBITT, supra note 193, at 13 (noting that the intent of a constitutional
provision’s framers and ratifiers is the distinguishing feature of the historical
modality of constitutional interpretation).
370. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (referencing the legislative history of the
Seventeenth Amendment in reaching the conclusion that the ELECT Act would be
constitutional).
371. See id. (suggesting that the Amendment’s legislative history, which evinces the
intent of its framers, “strongly favors” applying the Elections Clause to vacancy-filling
Senate elections).
372. See HOEBEKE, supra note 60, at 157–85 (tracing the Amendment’s path to
ratification, which the author deemed “the deliberation to end all deliberations”);
supra Part I.C.2 (detailing the Amendment’s long, tumultuous journey).
373. See supra Part I.C.2 (describing the positions of both the Amendment’s
supporters and detractors as it was debated in Congress).
374. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 161–65 (outlining and ranking the various
sources of legislative history).
375. Id. at 162.
376. See S. REP. NO. 62-35, at 1–2 (1911) (accompanying the Senate Judiciary
Committee’s minority report opposing the proposed amendment providing for
popular election of senators and recommending an amendment that maintained
Congress’s Elections Clause authority over Senate elections); S. REP. NO. 61-961, at 1
(1911) (accompanying the Senate Judiciary Committee’s majority recommendation
for a proposed amendment that stripped Congress’s Elections Clause authority over
Senate elections).
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Congress’s reasons for supporting the Seventeenth Amendment: to
free deadlocked state legislatures to attend to other business in their
states; to prevent corruption; to further the goals of open, democratic
representation; and to align the Constitution with the public’s
377
This clear
overwhelming support for direct Senate elections.
statement of legislative purpose and goals can be instructive to a
court analyzing whether prospective federal legislation violates the
378
Seventeenth Amendment.
The Senate Judiciary Committee’s Minority Report, which rejected
any alteration to Congress’s Elections Clause authority, provides
further specific insight into how Congress understood the
379
Amendment’s relationship with the Elections Clause. This Minority
Report argued against making wholesale changes to the federal
elections structure contemplated by the Framers in the Elections
380
Clause.
Because this minority opinion reflected the position that
eventually passed the Senate—that the Seventeenth Amendment
would not alter the Elections Clause—it is a particularly relevant
piece of legislative history that courts could—and should—turn to
381
when interpreting the Amendment.
When courts examine legislative history, the proposal and failure
382
of amendments is also instructive. As discussed above, the original
proposal for the Seventeenth Amendment included making states the
383
exclusive regulators of Senate elections, a proposal that would have
384
altered Congress’s Elections Clause power.
However, the Senate

377. S. REP. NO. 61-961, pt. VIII–XI, at 13–15 (1911).
378. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 162 (noting that the Holy Trinity Court relied
on a committee report to reach its decision).
379. S. REP. NO. 62-35, at 1–5 (1911) (noting that the proposed amendment did
not necessarily secure the direct election of senators by the people, that the
proposed changes would be “fundamental and vital change[s] . . . and should be
regarded as far more important than the change from legislative to direct election of
[s]enators,” and that the change would disturb the balance of power in both the
Constitution itself and the branches of the government).
380. Id.
381. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 162–63 (explaining that, when considering
legislative intent, “[i]t can be instructive to see what the committee . . . changed or
rejected”).
382. Id.; see also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 515 (1979)
(finding rejected amendments useful in interpreting statutory language).
383. S. REP. NO. 61-961 (1911) (providing that each state would be responsible for
determining the “time, place, and manner” of holding popular elections for Senators
and that, in the event of a vacancy, the state executive branch would have exclusive
power of filling the vacancy).
384. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 208, 211 (noting that several representatives and
senators proposed amendments to the original version of H.J. Res. 39 because the
original version essentially eliminated Congress’s Elections Clause authority over
Senate elections).
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385

rejected that provision, and the House later defeated a last-ditch
386
attempt to reinsert that language into the Amendment. Ultimately,
two-thirds of both the House and Senate passed the Seventeenth
387
Amendment without the rejected Elections Clause language.
This
shows both that Congress was aware of the issue of whether states or
the federal government should have final authority over Senate
election regulations and that Congress chose to maintain its “make or
388
alter” power over Senate elections. Accordingly, any interpretation
of the Seventeenth Amendment concluding that Congress abrogated
its Elections Clause authority over any type of Senate elections is,
arguably, incongruent with Congress’s explicit intent and, thus, in
389
conflict with the historical approach.
Courts that have interpreted the Seventeenth Amendment have
reached a similar conclusion. In Newberry, the Supreme Court found
that the Seventeenth Amendment left the Elections Clause “intact
and applicable both to the election of Representatives and
390
Senators.” Later, Valenti confirmed that, even after the ratification
of the Seventeenth Amendment, states still derived their authority to
regulate Senate elections from the Elections Clause rather than from
391
a new grant of authority within the Amendment itself.
Similarly,
the Trinsey court relied on the Elections Clause to uphold a particular
385. See id. at 211 (explaining that a substitute for H.J. Res. 39, which removed the
language of the originally proposed amendment that gave states exclusive control of
senatorial elections, was passed with a two-thirds majority).
386. Id. at 213; see also Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (emphasizing the Southern
Senators’ failed attempts to re-insert anti-Elections Clause language into the final
version of the Amendment to reach the conclusion that the Amendment’s legislative
history counsels that the “as the legislature may direct” clause did not leave any
exclusive power to states).
387. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 213–14 (recounting the end stages of
congressional debate over the Seventeenth Amendment).
388. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791 (1983) (suggesting that evidence of
opposition to a legislative provision “demonstrat[es] that the subject was considered
carefully and the action not taken thoughtlessly”); Amar & Schaps, supra note 175
(inferring that Congress’s rejection of these Elections Clause changes meant that the
ratifiers of the Seventeenth Amendment knew it left that Clause untouched).
389. See Amar, supra note 315 (stating that the author has not seen a historical
analysis of the Constitution that would call into question the validity of legislation
like the ELECT Act).
390. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 252 (1921) (quoting 46 CONG. REC.
848 (statement of Senator Borah)), abrogated by Burroughs & Cannon v. United
States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
391. Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 856 (W.D.N.Y. 1968) (per curiam)
(noting that if the drafters of the amendment had desired a “radical departure” from
the traditional understanding of the Elections Clause, then they could have written
the amendment to reflect that legislative priority), aff’d, 393 U.S. 405 (1969). The
Valenti Court also held that, notwithstanding the Seventeenth Amendment, states still
had “reasonable discretion” over the timing and manner of conducting Senate
elections, particularly those held to fill sudden vacancies. Id. at 866.
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Most recently, in the
Senate election regulation in Pennsylvania.
Seventh Circuit’s initial Judge opinion, the court explicitly found that
a “state legislature’s power to make laws governing vacancy elections
is limited by Congress’s power under the Elections Clause to ‘make or
393
alter’ such regulations.”
This unambiguous interpretation of the
relationship between the Elections Clause and the Seventeenth
Amendment shows that states may regulate the “[t]imes, [p]laces,
and [m]anner” of Senate elections only insofar as Congress does not
394
make other regulations or alter any pre-existing state laws.
Given this clear message of the legislative history and interpretive
case law of both the “as the legislature may direct” clause and the
whole Amendment, it would seem incoherent not to apply the
Elections Clause to all Senate elections, including those to fill vacant
395
seats.
Yet, as noted above, the plain text of the “as the legislature
may direct” clause plausibly can be read as an exclusive grant of
396
power to the states, which creates a conflict between the textual and
historical analytical approaches.
In Marsh, the Supreme Court suggested that, when presented with
competing outcomes from a textual and historical analysis, the
397
historical approach prevails.
Thus, a similar result is likely when
analyzing the conflict between the Elections Clause and the
Seventeenth Amendment. Taken alone, the words “as the legislature
398
may direct” imply an exclusive grant of state power. However, the
Amendment’s legislative history shows that its drafters’ motivation
was to take power away from the states by having the people directly
392. Trinsey v. Pennsylvania, 941 F.2d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 1991) (acknowledging
that the Elections Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment work together to confer
power upon the states to regulate Senate elections).
393. Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 554 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2958
(2011). But see Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 866 (emphasis added) (finding that the
Seventeenth Amendment only “confer[red] a reasonable discretion upon the states
concerning the timing and manner of conducting vacancy elections”).
394. Judge, 612 F.3d at 554. However, at least one court has found that the
legislative history of the “as the legislature may direct” clause is not entirely clear. See
Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 231 (finding the clause’s legislative history too vague to guide the
court’s analysis in determining the legislative intent of the clause).
395. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (concluding that the ELECT Act would be
constitutional because of the prevailing interpretation of the Seventeenth
Amendment).
396. See supra Part II.B.1 (applying textualism to the Seventeenth Amendment).
397. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (upholding Nebraska’s
tradition of beginning each legislative session with a chaplain-led prayer, even
though this practice seemed to violate the plain language of the First Amendment;
the emphasized intention of the original framers of the First Amendment, which was
evinced by the fact that chaplains actually led prayers during the earliest sessions of
Congress).
398. See supra Part II.B.1 (determining the plain meaning of the Seventeenth
Amendment).
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399

In fact, the Amendment only passed after
vote for their senators.
repeated failed attempts by some lawmakers to add explicit language
altering the Elections Clause’s reach over Senate elections, which is
evidence that the ratifiers of the Amendment understood the
400
Elections Clause remained in full effect.
Therefore, following the
Court’s lead in Marsh, this clear legislative history and subsequent
evidence of its understanding can trump the otherwise plain meaning
of “as the legislature may direct,” meaning that the historical analysis
could outweigh the textual analysis in the minds of a majority of the
401
Court.
An additional reason for this outcome is the fear of judicial
overreach, including the risk of improperly interpreting statutes as
402
being implicit repeals of other pre-existing laws. Hence, repeal by
403
implication is strongly disfavored, as courts presume that because
legislators are aware of all pre-existing legislation, they only explicitly
404
repeal existing laws.
As evinced by its decision in Morton, the Supreme Court prefers
reconciling seemingly contradictory statutory provisions rather than
405
finding that Congress implicitly repealed the earlier statute.
A
similar approach is applicable to the conflict between the
Seventeenth Amendment and the Elections Clause. Reading “as the
legislature may direct” as an exclusive grant of state power would
implicitly repeal the Elections Clause’s application to special Senate
406
elections.
However, Congress rejected such an explicit repeal of
399. See generally ROSSUM, supra note 54 (detailing the impetus behind changing
the way Senators are elected).
400. Amar & Schaps, supra note 175.
401. See, e.g., Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791–93 (1983) (upholding Nebraska’s chaplainled prayer because the First Congress and other early federal legislative meetings
engaged in a similar custom, even though the plain meaning of the Establishment
Clause suggests that this is an impermissible endorsement of religion).
402. See Purdum & Toner, supra note 253 (noting Chief Justice Robert’s warning
that judges only need to be the umpires in a courtroom).
403. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 192, at 94–95 (stating that “[t]here is a
presumption against repeal by implication” because, without express repeal, “the
legislature probably did not intend to repeal the earlier act” and whenever possible
new legislation should be read to coexist with the earlier statute).
404. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 146 (explaining that legislatures make laws with
the general intent of changing something; legislators are presumed “aware of the
conflicting, existing law and specifically opt[] not to repeal it”).
405. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) (reconciling two conflicting
provisions, the Employment Opportunity Act and the Indian Reorganization Act, by
holding that the IRA’s specific clause granting federal-hiring preference to Native
Americans for certain jobs was merely an exception to the EEO’s general prohibition
of using race as a factor in federal hiring at all).
406. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (noting the presumption that the
Elections Clause extends to all elections for federal office). Accordingly, not
applying it to vacancy-filling elections would be an implied repeal of the Clause to
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the Elections Clause during the debate over the Seventeenth
407
Amendment. Therefore, applying the analysis of Morton, the “as the
legislature may direct” clause instead should be reconciled with the
408
Elections Clause.
These clauses can be reconciled by viewing “as
the legislature may direct” as either a reminder of states’ initial role
in promulgating elections regulations, which remains subject to
congressional oversight, or as a clarification that legislatures, not
409
governors, are in charge of making state election laws.
As in
Morton, either of those interpretations gives effect to both the preexisting provision (the Elections Clause) and the later-enacted
provision (the Seventeenth Amendment), thereby reconciling the
two clauses rather than reading one as an implied repeal of the other.
Consequently, applying the canon against implied repeal bolsters the
conclusion that an intentionalist analysis favors applying the Elections
Clause to all Senate elections.
4.

Federal legislation is a superior approach to amending the U.S.
Constitution in order to solve the current problems in how U.S. Senate
vacancies are filled
410
Punctuated by recent events like the scandal in Illinois, it has
become increasingly clear that Senate vacancies should be filled in a
uniform way throughout the country. This uniformity should be
411
based on the principle that direct elections are best.
Moreover,
perpetual concerns about terrorism highlight the risks that several
Senate seats could become vacant simultaneously should an
412
unspeakable tragedy hit Congress and the country.
Even in lesstragic circumstances, such as when a Senate seat is vacated because
the sitting senator chooses to take a position within a presidential

that narrow subset of elections. Id.
407. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 213–14 (discussing the failure of Representative
Bartlett’s amendment seeking to abolish federal oversight of Senate elections).
408. Cf. Morton, 417 U.S. at 550 (avoiding an implicit repeal by reconciling two
potentially contradictory provisions in separate statutes).
409. See Stern, supra note 174 (suggesting myriad reasons why the “as the
legislature may direct” clause was added to the Amendment).
410. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (detailing Governor Blagojevich’s
political corruption when he attempted to sell his State’s open Senate seat to the
highest bidder, an illegal action that ultimately led to his impeachment and
conviction).
411. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (agreeing with the premise that direct
election is the best way to elect senators, but expressing doubt that eliminating
temporary gubernatorial appointments altogether should be part of the solution to
address the current problems surrounding Senate vacancies).
412. See id. (elaborating on the crippling effect such an attack could have on
governmental functionality).
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413

administration, delays in filling Senate vacancies risk denying each
414
state its constitutionally-mandated number of votes in Congress.
However, while both legislation like the ELECT Act or a
constitutional amendment like S.J. Res. 7 would substantively address
the problems with the current ad hoc approach to filling Senate
vacancies, a standard legislative approach is superior for a number of
415
reasons.
Chief among these reasons is that legislation is a
significantly easier political accomplishment than amending the
Constitution. Since the first ten amendments were ratified in 1791,
lawmakers have only amended the Constitution seventeen
416
subsequent times in the last 220 years. This is no surprise given the
rigorous nature of the amendment process, which requires the
support of two-thirds of both houses of Congress and three-fourths of
417
the states for ratification.
Today, finding this high threshold of support for any prospective
418
constitutional amendment seems almost unimaginable.
This is
likely to be especially true for an amendment that would federalize
the regulation of special Senate elections because popular political
factions, such as the Tea Party, generally oppose the Seventeenth
419
Amendment’s consolidation of power in the federal government.
413. See supra notes 176–184 and accompanying text (highlighting that exact
scenario when President Barack Obama selected his first Cabinet).
414. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (discussing the “antidemocratic
consequences” of leaving Senate seats vacant for extended periods).
415. See id. (supporting the ELECT Act over S.J. Res. 7, which proposed amending
the Constitution); see also supra Parts II.B.1–3 (concluding that a legislative solution is
permissible because a textual, structural, and historical analysis of the relationship
between the Seventeenth Amendment and the Elections Clause shows that Congress
does have ultimate authority to regulate vacancy-filling Senate elections).
416. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (representing the last amendment added to
the Constitution).
417. See U.S. CONST. art. V (outlining the amending process). Alternatively, twothirds of states can call a Constitutional Convention to propose an amendment in
lieu of the traditional process in which Congress first passes an amendment through
a two-thirds vote of each chamber. Id.; see also Mary Frances Berry, Amending the
Constitution: How Hard It Is to Change, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1987, at 93
(recounting the difficulty in attempting the pass the Equal Rights Amendment,
which never gained enough support for ratification into the Constitution).
418. Per Article V, a prospective constitutional amendment today would need the
support of at least 290 congressmen, sixty-seven senators, and thirty-eight state
legislatures in order to be ratified. The sixty-seven senator threshold might be
particularly onerous given the record number of filibusters during the 111th
Congress. See Brian Beutler, 111th Senate Breaks a Filibuster Record, TALKING POINTS
MEMO (Dec. 23, 2010, 9:24 AM), http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/
12/111th-senate-breaks-one-filibuster-record.php (noting that Senate Democrats,
who held the majority in that chamber during the 111th Congress, were forced to
break more filibusters than at any other time before).
419. See supra Part I.C.5 (noting the relevancy of the Seventeenth Amendment to
current political discourse, which includes the push by some in the Tea Party to
repeal the Amendment altogether).
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Conversely, regular legislation, like the ELECT Act, only requires a
simple majority vote of support in the House and Senate to become
420
law.
Therefore, when juxtaposed with the prospects of amending
the Constitution, regular federal legislation is the most politicallyfeasible option for dealing with the Senate vacancy problem in the
421
current political climate.
An additional advantage of regular legislation is the relative ease
422
For instance, if
with which that legislation could be changed.
Congress passed legislation like the ELECT Act and a large number
of states had valid complaints about a certain provision of the law,
Congress could repeal or amend the law through the normal
423
legislative process as outlined above. Theoretically, Congress could
tweak this legislation until it reached the optimal set of regulations
for vacancy-filling Senate elections.
A constitutional amendment, however, would impose a permanent
424
rule for how vacancies could be filled.
If some portion of the
amendment proved to be unworkable, the only way to fix that flaw
would be to re-start the constitutional amendment process to
425
effectuate a repeal of the new amendment. Therefore, the nation
would be stuck with an imperfect constitutional amendment, which
could only be removed through the arduous ratification process.
Accordingly, basic federal legislation is preferable to the drastic step
426
of amending the Constitution.

420. This would require 218 votes in the House and 51 votes in the Senate.
However, modern Senate filibuster rules would effectively require a sixty-vote
supermajority to pass this legislation in the Senate. See Standing RULES OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE, § 22.2 (1986), http://rules.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?p=RuleXXII (requiring sixty votes to invoke cloture on any motion before
the Senate).
421. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (supporting federal legislation over a
constitutional amendment by noting that statutes are more easily perfectible).
422. See id. (observing that statutory enactment can more easily respond to states’
experiences).
423. For example, the Senate recently amended a perceived flaw in the newlyenacted Affordable Care Act, President Obama’s signature health care reform
legislation. See Vicki Needham, Senate Approves 1099 Repeal as Amendment to FAA
Measure, THE HILL (Feb. 2, 2011, 7:08 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-themoney/domestic-taxes/141855-senate-approves-1099-repeal-as-amendment-to-faameasure (discussing how the Senate repealed a health care reform provision that
required small business owners to submit “onerous” 1099 tax forms).
424. See U.S. CONST. art. V (setting forth the exclusive means for amending the
Constitution).
425. Id.
426. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (arguing that the Constitution should only
be amended when the public distrusts Congress to maintain a certain new legal
framework).
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CONCLUSION
Prompted by fears of corruption, state legislative overburdening,
427
and the undemocratic nature of having legislatures select senators,
Congress and the states ratified the Seventeenth Amendment in
428
1912, compelling the direct popular election of U.S Senators.
Those same fears have resurfaced in recent years regarding the
429
Accordingly, some
process by which Senate vacancies are filled.
lawmakers have proposed solutions to standardize how states fill
430
Senate vacancies.
However, an apparent conflict between the
Elections Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment has called into
question whether Congress can take action in this area short of
amending the Constitution.
Based on a textual, structural, and historical analysis of that
conflict, this Comment concludes that Congress does have the
authority to regulate all types of Senate elections. During the
Seventeenth Amendment ratification debate, Congress passionately
debated who should have ultimate authority over Senate election
431
regulations. In the end, those favoring federal control won, leaving
432
Thus, the
the Elections Clause applicable to Senate elections.
contemporary understanding of those who drafted and ratified the
Amendment shows that they expected Congress to have regulatory
433
power over Senate elections.
Although a plain reading of the “as
the legislature may direct” clause arguably finds that states retained
434
exclusive control over vacancy-filling elections, this would be an
427. See S. Rep. No. 61-961, at 1, 13–15 (1911) (articulating reasons for supporting
the popular election of senators).
428. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (compelling the direct election of U.S.
Senators); supra notes 102–105 and accompanying text (chronicling the final stages
in the Seventeenth Amendment’s ratification journey).
429. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (noting how the recent Rod Blagojevich
scandal in Illinois, among other recent questionable vacancy-filling appointments,
prompted federal lawmakers to address concerns over how Senate vacancies are
filled); supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (detailing Blagojevich’s fall from
grace in Illinois).
430. See H.R. 899, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing that all Senate vacancies must
be filled by a direct election within ninety days of the seat becoming open, but
allowing governors to make temporary appointments to fill the seat until that
election occurs); S.J. Res. 7, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing a constitutional
amendment that would entirely ban even temporary appointments to the Senate).
431. See supra Part I.C.2 (outlining the arduous ratification journey of the
Seventeenth Amendment, including the passionate fight between supporters of
federal oversight of Senate elections and advocates of states being the final arbiters
of Senate election regulations).
432. Id.
433. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (arguing that the contemporary view of
the Seventeenth Amendment’s framers should be persuasive evidence of its
applicability to all Senate elections today).
434. See supra notes 301–10 and accompanying text (conducting a textual analysis
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absurd result given Congress’s motivations for ratifying the
435
Moreover, the Supreme Court has
Amendment in the first place.
dismissed such textual analysis when contrary structural and historical
436
analyses compelled a different result.
Because of this analysis, this Comment also argues that a legislative
approach to addressing the problems of Senate vacancies is better
437
than a constitutional amendment.
The most important reason is
that amending the Constitution is a comparatively herculean task,
requiring the support of two-thirds of Congress and three-fourths of
438
states. Given the current political gridlock in the United States, it is
439
Moreover,
exceedingly hard to imagine that scenario happening.
constitutional amendments carry the risk of permanency, potentially
burdening the country with an unworkable system if any aspects of a
440
proposed constitutional amendment prove to be untenable.
Consequently, a statutory solution to the problems caused by current
senate vacancy-filling laws is both constitutionally permissible and
politically preferable.

of the “as the legislature may direct” clause, which found that the plain meaning of
that clause does suggest exclusive state authority of vacancy-filling Senate elections).
435. See supra notes 322–28 and accompanying text (concluding that the Holy
Trinity “absurd result” exception would require applying the Elections Clause to all
Senate elections).
436. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476–89 (2005) (relying on structural
and historical analysis to find that the Twenty-First Amendment, despite its clear
language suggesting otherwise, did not overturn the application of the Dormant
Commerce Clause to state liquor regulations); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
786–91 (1983) (using historical analysis to find that the First Amendment, despite its
clear wording regarding the freedom of religion, did not ban state-employed
chaplains from beginning a legislative session with a public prayer).
437. See supra Part II.B.4 (positing reasons why regular legislation is preferable to
the difficult task of amending the Constitution).
438. See supra note 315 (discussing the comparative difficulties of amending the
Constitution as opposed to passing regular federal legislation).
439. See Tim Rice, Analysis: U.S. May Be Entering Age of Political Deadlock, REUTERS
(July 28, 2011, 10:45 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/28/us-usa-debtgridlock-idUSTRE76R43U20110728 (suggesting that, by mid-2011, the federal
government had entered an “era of deadlock” and was embroiled in a “crisis of
governance,” evinced in part by the prolonged debate during the summer and fall of
2011 among House Republicans, Senate Democrats, and the Obama Administration
over raising the federal debt ceiling).
440. See supra notes 422–26 and accompanying text (arguing that flexible federal
legislation is preferable to a rigid, permanent constitutional amendment).

